The Urgent Need for Legal Scholarship on Firearm Policy by Stevenson, Dru
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 67 Number 5 Article 5 
12-1-2019 
The Urgent Need for Legal Scholarship on Firearm Policy 
Dru Stevenson 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Legal Studies Commons, and the Second Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dru Stevenson, The Urgent Need for Legal Scholarship on Firearm Policy, 67 Buff. L. Rev. 1449 (2019). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol67/iss5/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
 
1449 
Buffalo Law Review 
VOLUME 67 DECEMBER 2019 NUMBER 5 
The Urgent Need for Legal Scholarship on 
Firearm Policy 
DRU STEVENSON 
Restrictions on federal funding for research pertaining to firearm 
policy have stymied academic inquiry by social science and public 
health researchers for over two decades. As a result, most researchers 
agree that our public discourse about this urgent issue is woefully 
under-informed, or even ill-informed, on both sides of the debate. 
Legal academia, which does not operate under the same grant-
writing regime as most other disciplines, can and should help fill 
this gap in researching and theorizing the unresolved questions 
related to firearm policy. In fact, theoretical development and 
clarification from the legal academy is often a necessary antecedent 
for empirical researchers in other fields to frame and develop their 
own studies properly, especially about the real-world effects of 
competing policy approaches to firearms. This Essay sets forth a plea 
to law professors to undertake much-needed research in this area 
and offers suggestions of understudied topics with low entry barriers 
for legal commentators. Recommendations for interdisciplinary 
collaborative efforts round out this discussion. A brief conclusion 
reaches the endgame issue: ensuring access to the work we produce. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay is a plea for more legal scholarship about gun 
prevalence, gun violence, and the legal system’s response. 
Public discourse on this topic suffers from a chronic dearth 
of reliable data, even-handed analysis, or truly innovative 
policy proposals.1 
Federal law currently restricts research funding for 
studies or scholarship that could somehow support “gun 
control.”2 For the last twenty years—the same period when 
mass shootings became an epidemic and annual gunshot 
fatalities reached parity with annual traffic fatalities—the 
CDC, the NIH, and other federal agencies that normally fund 
research have refused to fund much-needed studies about 
gun violence and gun prevalence.3 Commonly known as the 
Dickey Amendment,4 the funding restriction takes the form 
 
 1. See RAND CORP., Improving Gun Policy Science, https://www.rand.org/ 
research/gun-policy/essays/improving-gun-policy-science.html. 
 2. See KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED 87–89 (2006) (chronicling the CDC’s 
gradual entrance into the treatment of gun violence as a public health or 
epidemiological problem, and the N.R.A.’s stunningly successful maneuvers to 
defund, delegitimize, and deprive federal agencies of the money or statutory 
authority to conduct investigations into firearm prevalence or gun violence); 
DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS PUBLIC HEALTH xiv–xvi (2d ed. 2017); IGOR 
VOLSKY, GUNS DOWN 116–18 (2019) (describing the funding restrictions and 
arguing for the need for more research grants) Arthur L. Kellermann & Frederick 
P. Rivara, Silencing the Science on Gun Research, 309 JAMA 549 (2013). 
 3. See Donald L. Flexner, Why the Civilian Purchase, Use, and Sale of 
Assault Weapons and Semiautomatic Rifles and Pistols, Along With Large 
Capacity Magazines, Should Be Banned, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 
606 n. 76 (2017) (“One reason for the lack of research on the AWB is that the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) which, among other things, 
researches how violence affects public health, is legally prohibited from studying 
the role firearms play in American deaths. After the CDC began studying gun 
violence in the early 1990s, the NRA successfully lobbied for the Dickey 
Amendment . . .”); Andrew J. McClurg, In Search of the Golden Mean in the Gun 
Debate, 58 HOW. L.J. 779, 786 (2015) (“The National Rifle Association (NRA) and 
other gun-rights advocates lobbied Congress to disband the CDC’s National 
Center for Injury Prevention, the center that funded the research.”). 
 4. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 242–44, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
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of an uncodified, perennial budget rider.5 The grantmaking 
agencies interpret the prohibition verbiage more broadly 
than most courts would,6 so that even after an Executive 
Order from President Obama encouraging research about 
“causes of gun violence,” and revised verbiage in the 
Amendment stating the same, the grantmaking agencies 
remain reticent,7 funding only a handful of research projects 
at major universities, compared to hundreds of grants for 
trendier topics.8 Prominent statisticians and other analysts 
have recently decried the unreliability and instability of the 
data provided by the CDC about firearm incidents9—but 
 
 5. Former Congressman Jay Dickey, the amendment’s namesake, now 
regrets placing restrictions on gun violence research, writing in an op-ed that 
“scientific research helped reduce the U.S. motor vehicle death rate and save 
hundreds of thousands of lives - all without getting rid of cars.” Jay Dickey & 
Mark Rosenburg, Time for Collaboration on Gun Studies, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 
2016), archive.commercialappeal.com/opinion/analysis/jay-dickey-and-mark-
rosenberg-time-for-collaboration-on-gun-studies-27fc4279-5045-04ca-e053-
0100007f-366283301.html (calling for significant increases in funding for 
research on means of preventing gun violence). 
 6. See Allen Rostrond, A New State Ice Age for Gun Policy, 10 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 327, 359 (2016) (“Although the amendment merely prohibited studies 
that advocate or promote gun control and therefore did not necessarily block all 
funding of research on gun violence, the amendment and related threats to slash 
CDC’s budget were a ‘shot fired across the bow’ that intimidated researchers and 
deterred CDC from supporting any work that might be perceived as antigun.”). 
 7. See Marian E. Betz, et al., Frozen Funding on Firearm Research: Doing 
Nothing Is No Longer an Acceptable Solution, 17 WEST. J. EMERG. MED 91 (2016). 
 8. See Sandro Galea, et al., Priorities in Recovering From a Lost Generation 
of Firearms Research, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 858 (2018), https://ajph. 
aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304436; Jonathan M. Metzl, 
Repeal the Dickey Amendment to Address Polarization Surrounding Firearms in 
the United States, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 864 (2018), https://ajph. 
aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304461; Allen Rostron, The 
Dickey Amendment on Federal Funding for Research on Gun Violence: A Legal 
Dissection, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 865 (2018), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/ 
doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304450. 
 9. See HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at xiv (describing the National Violent 
Death Reporting System (NVDRS) and the limitations due to its being 
unavailable in many states); see also Sean Campbell & Daniel Nass, 11 Senators 
Want To Know Why The CDC’s Gun Injury Estimates Are Unreliable, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 29, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ 
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remember, the CDC continues to work with funding 
restraints on this subject. Due to similar statutory 
constraints, ATF data about firearms used in crimes are 
unavailable to researchers as well.10 
Historically, law professors have left most of the 
empirical research about the effects of laws and policies to 
their counterparts in the social sciences: sociologists, 
economists, decision theorists, forensic psychologists, 
statisticians, and political science professors. Of course, 
there are exceptions and a modest trend toward empirical 
legal scholarship, but many of these projects either rely upon 
useful research from these other disciplines or have a co-
author from those disciplines. In the area of firearm 
regulations, such research is missing. Unlike law professors, 
research faculty in these other disciplines depend heavily on 
grants to fund their research projects—it is an entrenched 
part of the business model for these departments in the 
universities, as well as for think tanks and similar 
opportunities for academicians in non-law fields. 
A categorical funding ban effectively shifts research to 
other topics, even for graduate students making their initial 
selection of a dissertation topic, and subsequent path 
dependence reinforces the funding disincentives. Compared 
to other policy issues of our time, these leave a substantial 
gap in research and available data. “Thus, much knowledge 
about firearms is lacking—there are few longitudinal data 
sets that have asked questions about firearms to help 
determine the risks and benefits of a gun in the home, or gun 
 
11-senators-want-to-know-why-the-cdcs-gun-injury-estimates-are-unreliable; 
Sean Campbell & Daniel Nass, The CDC’s Gun Injury Data Is Becoming Even 
Less Reliable, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 11, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/this-years-cdc-gun-injury-data-is-even-less-reliable-than-last-years; 
Sean Campbell, Daniel Nass & Mai Nguyen, The CDC Is Publishing Unreliable 
Data On Gun Injuries; People Are Using It Anyway, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 4, 
2018, 5:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-cdc-is-publishing-
unreliable-data-on-gun-injuries-people-are-using-it-anyway. 
 10. See HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at xv. 
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carrying, over time.”11 The RAND Corporation in 2018 
conducted a thorough review of the academic literature 
addressing the effects of gun prevalence and regulation (from 
child-safety locks to waiting periods, and from background 
checks to taxation of firearms or ammunition)12—and 
concluded that there remained insufficient support for or 
against every gun policy except one.13 RAND places the 
blame for this dearth of empirical research mostly on the 
Dickey Amendment (I will return below to what RAND and 
others are trying to do about this).14 Legislators, regulators, 
and other policymakers operate under a veil of mandated 
ignorance about which policies are effective, and which are 
counterproductive. The National Academy of Sciences 
reached a similar conclusion in its overview of the extant 
empirical research in 2013: “Additionally, the lack of 
comprehensive datasets and the wide variety of sources and 
the fact that the data lead to contradictory conclusions call 
into question the reliability and validity of gun-violence 
data.”15 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. See RAND CORP., More Research Could Help Prevent Gun Violence in 
America (July 10, 2018), https://www.rand.org/blog/rand-review/2018/07/more-
research-could-help-prevent-gun-violence-in-america.html. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. In the mid-1990s, Congress zeroed out the budget for gun violence 
prevention at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) after some 
of its studies linked home gun ownership with higher rates of firearm deaths. 
Congress also prohibited the use of federal research funding to promote gun 
control. The CDC has since interpreted that rule, advocated by the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) and known as the Dickey Amendment, as an outright ban on 
most gun research. That has left mostly private foundations and universities to 
search for evidence about what works and what doesn’t to prevent gun violence. 
Without government support, they also work without much government data. 
Researchers wanting to follow trends in gun ownership rates, for example, have 
had to try to estimate those numbers from hunting permits, firearm suicide rates, 
even subscriptions to Guns & Ammo magazine. 
 15. THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF FIREARM-RELATED VIOLENCE 
9 (Alan I. Leshner et al. eds. 2013). The report continues: “The predominant use 
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It gets worse. In many fields, the private corporate sector 
contributes to the advancement of knowledge through its 
own research and development, or through partnering with 
university researchers, such as the partnerships in the hard 
sciences between university laboratories and the 
pharmaceutical, agribusiness, and oil companies. In terms of 
research about injuries and fatalities, the insurance industry 
conducts extensive actuarial and statistical research, both 
internally and externally, so that they can price their policies 
based on accurate assessments of risk—the likelihood and 
seriousness of foreseeable incidents and mishaps. For 
example, every year the nine largest providers of legal 
malpractice insurance collectively hire Ames & Gough, a risk 
consulting firm, to study the trends in legal malpractice 
payouts (many of which occur extrajudicially and would 
otherwise be undiscoverable).16 They provide a detailed 
report to the industry’s leaders about the types of attorney 
mistakes or misconduct that generate the most claims, and 
the largest claims, as well as other trends in the size of 
payouts, the most hazardous areas of practice, precautionary 
suggestions, and so forth.17 Such research is informative and 
useful, not only for insurers and their policyholders (the law 
firms), but also for the academy, for state bar ethics 
committees, and for the judiciary. The Ames & Gough 
studies also challenge some of the American Bar 
Association’s own research about these same questions, 
which draws from entirely different data sources.18 
 
of research study designs that have limited ability to study causality, like case-
control and ecological studies that aggregate data from sources and levels, have 
compounded the challenge faced by researchers and policy makers alike.” Id. at 
10. See also id. at 55 (describing how the lack of federal research funding has 
delayed the development of various gun safety features, such as “smart guns.”). 
 16. See Ames & Gough, LPLI 2018 Claims Survey: Legal Malpractice Claims 
Increase in Severity and Scope as Firms Adapt to Market Realities. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: 
2012–2015 (2016). 
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No such studies about insurance claims or payouts are 
available regarding firearm injuries. Federal statutes 
currently provide immunity from liability for gun 
manufacturers19 in most cases. This statutory immunity 
preempts state tort law. Thus, insurers have little incentive 
to expend resources investigating the causes or trends in 
firearm injuries, as do firearm manufacturers. Private-sector 
funding is missing in this area, especially compared to other 
products and services that are susceptible to liability claims. 
On the government side, there is little or no internal 
research by federal agencies themselves—even by the 
agencies that normally study and regulate health and 
safety.20 Firearms and ammunition are not subject to the 
same safety testing or risk assessment that the Consumer 
Products Safety Commission conducts (and publishes) for 
virtually every other consumer item,21 or that the FDA 
conducts for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, or that 
the EPA would demand for pesticides and fungicides, or the 
manufacturing specifications the NHTSA requires for 
automobiles. No other product on the market causes as many 
deaths of both consumers and innocent bystanders while 
having no federal regulations requiring safety features, 
warning labels, or manufacturing specifications.22 
 
 19. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 
Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012). See 
Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019) for an important 
recent court decision regarding this statute. See also VOLSKY, supra note 2, at 90–
91 (describing history and consequences of PLCAA). 
 20. See Olivia Li, Cars, Toys, and Aspirin Have to Meet Mandatory Safety 
Standards. Guns Don’t. Here’s Why, THE TRACE (Jan. 19, 2016), https:// 
www.thetrace.org/2016/01/gun-safety-standards/. 
 21. See PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE 
NEEDS TO KNOW 123–24 (2014) (describing statutory exclusions for guns from 
consumer product safety regulations). 
 22. See VOLKSY, supra note 2, at 94–96. Volsky explains the increasing 
problem with this information deficit: “The truth is, such oversight is more 
important now than ever before. Firearm manufacturers, in an effort to improve 
market share, are producing new products and militarized firearm accessories 
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Statutorily, the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
cannot conduct any research about guns, for example, 
whether a certain model is prone to accidental discharge.23 
N.R.A.-backed legislators ensured that the agency entrusted 
with reviewing accidental injuries and fatalities from 
consumer products could not evaluate the safety of any 
firearms or ammunition.24 
The legal academy is ideally situated to make valuable 
contributions to the public discourse about firearms. 
Professors at American law schools have an atypical degree 
of freedom to research and write about whatever we want—
we normally do not have to apply for grants or special 
funding for our research. Most law schools provide summer 
writing stipends to their faculty (with complete freedom to 
pick any law-related topic of research), as well as research 
sabbaticals, reduced teaching loads, and federally-funded 
research assistants (work study recipients do not, as far as I 
know, have to report or disclose what subjects they 
researched for their respective professors). 
We could, and should, help fill the gap in the research 
about gun violence, gun prevalence, and effective regulatory 
responses. We are fully funded researchers who can select 
our own research agendas. There is an urgent need for 
rigorous empirical research in this area, which a growing 
number of law professors know how to do. There is also an 
 
that may actually be making guns more dangerous. These changes are designed 
to excite an already saturated consumer base as gun ownership rates are 
shrinking and the gun supply is increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer 
people.” Id. at 95. 
 23. See Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. 94-284, § 3(e), 90 Stat. 504 (1976) provided that: “The Consumer Product 
Safety Commission shall make no ruling or order that restricts the manufacture 
or sale of firearms, firearms ammunition, or components of firearms ammunition, 
including black powder or gunpowder for firearms.” See also COOK & GOSS, supra 
note 21, at 123–24; VOLSKY, supra note 2, at 94–96. 
 24. See GOSS, supra note 2, at 78–79 (describing the legislative maneuvering 
in the 1970s to ensure that there would be no federal safety specifications or 
regulations for firearms or ammunition); VOLKSY, supra note 2, at 93–96. 
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urgent need for scholarship that utilizes more of the 
traditional toolbox of law professors—precisely defining 
crucial terms, delineating necessary exceptions to otherwise 
general rules, drafting model legislation, and drawing on the 
wealth of analogous research we already have on effective 
licensing and permitting policies, excise taxes, industrial 
reporting requirements, consumer protection, and so on. 
Given the situation with funding prohibitions on other 
disciplines, those of us in the legal academy have a civic duty 
to make guns a higher priority in our research agendas. A 
few professors have recently made significant contributions 
on this topic, such as John Donahue,25 Fredrick Vars,26 
Joseph Blocher,27 and Darrell Miller.28 Nevertheless, there is 
much more to do, and many more who could make valuable 
contributions to the scholarship. 
Apart from our own scholarly endeavors, many of us 
advise law review editors about potential symposium topics; 
we give students in our seminar courses suggestions for their 
paper topics; and we mentor junior faculty in their early-
career research. Those of us who supervise the student-
 
 25. See generally John J. Donohue, Abhay Aneja, & Kyle D. Weber, Right‐to‐
Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data 
and a State‐Level Synthetic Control Analysis, 16 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 198 (2019). 
 26. Angela Selvaggio & Fredrick E. Vars, “Bind Me More Tightly Still”: 
Voluntary Restraint Against Gun Suicide, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 671 (2016); see 
generally Fredrick E. Vars, Not Young Guns Anymore: Dementia and the Second 
Amendment, 25 ELDER L.J. 51 (2017); Fredrick E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun 
Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465 (2015). 
 27. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND 
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018); Joseph 
Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A. 
H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 
279 (2016); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A. H. Miller, What is Gun Control? Direct 
Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 
U. CHI. L. REV. 295 (2016); Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to 
Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 
67 DUKE L.J. 1433 (2018). 
 28. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh 
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 Yale L.J. 852 (2013). 
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edited journals at our law schools should encourage them to 
accept or solicit more (serious) articles in this area. When our 
counterparts in the social sciences do in fact publish 
scholarship in their peer-review journals, their publications 
are not available to the public free of charge—the peer-
review journals usually make online readers purchase the 
article for an unreasonable fee. In the legal academy, many 
of us post our manuscripts on the Social Science Research 
Network (freely available to the public), in addition to 
publishing them in law reviews. We have more freedom to 
make our research available to the public than those in other 
disciplines, and the public needs better information about 
guns and gun policy. Many law professors have widely read 
blogs; almost none of them blog about this. 
In the following section, Part II, I lay out some areas that 
would be particularly well-suited for research and 
commentary by law professors. Of course, there are many 
angles from which we could, and hopefully will, approach the 
complex problem of pervasive gun violence, which includes 
suicides. I suggest three areas that should have low entry 
barriers for those in the legal academy. 
First, taxation of firearms and ammunition is a 
surprisingly neglected subject in the legal literature, and 
there is little understanding of the current excise tax regime 
inside or outside of the legal academy. Yet there are many 
law professors who have expertise in excise taxes, sales 
taxes, use taxes, and special corporate tax penalties, and 
could easily apply that expertise to the firearm and 
ammunition industry. Tax professors are also familiar with 
some of the thornier issues of tax policy—the effects of excise 
or sales taxes on secondary markets (legal or illegal), 
elasticity of consumer demand, Pigouvian tax theory, 
Tiboutian theory of competitive tax regimes, tax compliance 
and enforcement, and the legislative process for modifying 
an existing tax regime, which is distinct from other 
legislative enactments. 
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The other two suggested starting points for legal 
academia are difficult definitional or conceptual issues: 
legitimate “defensive gun use,”29 which goes to the heart of 
the tradeoffs with gun prevalence, and state preemption 
laws,30 which prohibit municipalities from having local 
ordinances about firearm sales, storage, or use.31 The RAND 
researchers have singled out this former point as a consistent 
problem with sorting the existing data32—statistics about 
incidents where guns “saved lives” or stopped a criminal 
unfortunately include criminals themselves using guns 
defensively against rival criminals, incidents where gun 
owners misperceive an imaginary threat and immediately 
resort to lethal force, and in gun owners who merely imagine 
that the guns in their possession probably deterred would-be 
criminals from ever attempting a crime in the first place.33 It 
is important to develop a workable, legally precise definition 
of the operative terms before researchers can accurately 
evaluate the incidence or importance of defensive gun use. In 
other words, scholars familiar with the law of self-defense or 
defense of others, which includes numerous exceptions and 
limitations, could put that expertise to effective use in 
helping create a consensus about how to categorize incidents 
as one where a firearm saved the day.34 Firearms present a 
host of fascinating, and poorly understood, legal issues 
besides the constitutional questions (mostly centered around 
 
 29. RAND CORP., THE SCIENCE OF GUN POLICY: A CRITICAL SYNTHESIS OF 
RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF GUN POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 273–
87 (2018); see generally BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 27, at 152–54; COOK & 
GOSS, supra note 21, at 17–19. 
 30. See GOSS, supra note 2, at 162–65 (describing the preemption movement 
as an N.R.A. strategy). 
 31. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 27, at 189–90. 
 32. See RAND, supra note 29, at 274–80. 
 33. See COOK & GOSS, supra note 21, at 19–20 (discussing the problems with 
survey data in this area, due to respondents’ skewed perceptions). 
 34. See id. at 19 (“More fundamentally, what constitutes a legitimate DGU 
may be a matter of definition.”). 
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the Second Amendment and the judicial gloss it received in 
Heller). 
Part III serves to familiarize academic readers with some 
encouraging new initiatives that bear on scholarly 
productivity,35 such as the new National Collaborative on 
Gun Violence Research, which parallels and echoes the 
points I set forth in this piece, and the newly-established 
Center for Firearms Law at Duke Law School. The former 
commenced in 2018 with a generous grant by the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation, and is a clearinghouse for new 
research on gun violence.36 While the Collaborative is 
administered under the auspices and oversight of the RAND 
Corporation, the Arnold Foundation has pledged to provide 
generous funding to support the facilitation of conducting 
high-quality gun violence research.37 I have three main 
reasons for introducing readers to this specific project. First, 
the website is a great launching pad for researchers new to 
this area.38 It provides a balanced survey of the existing 
literature on various subtopics in the field and identifies 
many key areas for future research. In addition, the website 
can familiarize legal scholars with the terminology and 
nomenclatures essential to firearm research, and quickly get 
readers up to speed on the “knowns and unknowns” of gun 
policy. Second, some legal scholars would be good candidates 
for the Collective’s proposed projects—I believe that if more 
law professors were familiar with the type of scholars and 
 
 35. For a recent overview of private funding to fill in some of the gap created 
by the federal statutory restrictions, see Margot Sanger-Katz, Gun Research is 
Suddenly Hot, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/ 
upshot/gun-research-is-suddenly-hot.html. 
 36. See Andrew R. Morral, Press Release, Gun Violence Research 
Collaborative to Release First Request for Research Proposals in January, Names 
Advisory Committee (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.rand.org/news/press/ 2018/11/ 
15.html. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally NATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON GUN VIOLENCE RESEARCH, 
https://www.ncgvr.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
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researchers the Collective is seeking right now, they might 
be interested in applying. Third, the Collective’s focus on 
empirical research will often be complementary to, rather 
than duplicative of, the work that law professors do, but this 
type of interrelationship is useful and important. 
Additionally, the Duke Center for Firearms Law has 
amassed an extremely helpful repository of historical gun 
laws that is searchable by state39—a terrific resource for 
scholars writing in this area. Part III also includes a brief 
response to assertions by John Lott, a well-known advocate 
for increasing gun prevalence, that the curtailment of federal 
research funds is a “myth.” 
My brief Conclusion urges the legal academy to seek to 
remedy the underlying cause of the problem that has 
prompted this Essay—that is, we need to repeal (or more 
properly, remove) the Dickey Amendment from future 
budget bills. In the meantime, I urge both authors and law 
review editors alike to make special efforts to disseminate 
the research in this area without cost to the public, following 
the example of some of the most prestigious law review 
journals by providing digital archives on the journal’s 
website.40 In some cases, this may affect decisions about 
where or how to publish one’s final work, or at least could be 
an added provision to the publication agreements we have 
with law reviews. This part of my proposal also encourages 
more law professors who have high-readership blogs to direct 
readers’ attention to high-quality emerging scholarship 
about gun policy. Finally, I would encourage more law 
professors to participate in legislative drafting and lobbying 
projects—a crucial last step that the RAND-affiliated 
 
 39. REPOSITORY OF HISTORICAL GUN LAWS, https://law.duke.edu/gunlaws/. 
 40. See, e.g., STANFORD LAW REVIEW ONLINE, https://www.stanfordlawreview 
.org/online-archive/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019); UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW 
REVIEW PRINT EDITION, https://www.pennlawreview.com/print/ (last visited Oct. 
19, 2019); YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
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researchers are unlikely to do. 
A final note before proceeding to the next section: I will 
not take space here to recount the sickening series of mass 
shootings in recent years, or the general prevalence of gun 
homicides and suicides every year, as my readers must 
already be aware of this and other articles have covered 
these grounds in detail.41 Nor will I spend any time decrying 
the National Rifle Association, or trying to convince readers 
of the organization’s wealth and political influence, which 
seems excessively obvious. My goal is to wake up the legal 
academy to the special role that law professors can, and 
must, have in elevating the public discourse about guns 
despite the current stalemate. 
II. THREE UNDERSTUDIED SUBJECTS 
This section sets forth three areas that would be 
particularly well-suited for research and commentary by law 
professors, though this is only a start—the RAND website 
has a much longer list of topics that desperately need more 
scholarly research. I selected these three because they are 
areas that should have low entry barriers for those in the 
legal academy—they draw on the legal academician’s current 
knowledge base—and because they present issues that might 
prove more difficult or unfamiliar to researchers in other 
social science disciplines. 
A. Taxation 
Taxation of firearms or ammunition comes up in 
proposals (academic and non-academic) for controlling gun 
violence, but there is little or no discussion in the legal 
academic literature about the current tax regime that is 
already in place, how well it is working, or whether 
 
 41. This is also not another essay about assault rifles; personally, I believe 
handguns are a much bigger problem in our society, and that handguns are no 
more useful, necessary, or justifiable than rifles. 
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incremental modifications to the current tax framework 
would make a difference. Moreover, taxation has enjoyed an 
upswing in popularity in the last few years as a regulatory 
experiment for reducing gun violence, with states and 
municipalities taking initiative.42 Legal challenges are 
underway and are already reaching the appellate courts—
unfortunately, without a sturdy base of academic 
theorization of the issues involved. 
Unsurprisingly, the firearms industry “opposes any 
legislation that would raise taxes on the sale of firearms and 
ammunition.”43 The industry has three main arguments for 
their position: 1) given that bearing arms is a constitutional 
right, taxing the activity constitutes an unconstitutional poll 
tax; 2) criminals would not pay the taxes anyway, so the 
burden would fall entirely on law-abiding gun purchasers 
and would not reduce criminal gun use; and 3) the tax puts 
the jurisdiction at a competitive disadvantage, as purchasers 
will buy from other nontax jurisdictions, hurting local gun 
retailers and reducing tax revenue for the jurisdiction from 
their business tax.44 The constitutional argument (that gun 
taxes are a poll tax) merits further academic inquiry, but 
facially, it appears the Heller rubric permits at least the 
existing taxes on guns and ammunition.45 The local business 
 
 42. Rachel Bade, New Gun Control Strategy: Tax ‘Em, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2013), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/guns-bullets-taxes-gun-control-tool-
089782; Keith Wagstaff, Are High Taxes an Effective Form of Gun Control?, THE 
WEEK (Apr. 9, 2013), https://theweek.com/articles/465774/are-high-taxes-
firearms-effective-form-gun-control. 
 43. Unintended Consequences of Firearm and Ammunition Taxes, NATIONAL 
SHOOTING SPORTS FOUNDATION, https://www3.nssf.org/share/factsheets/PDF/ 
FirearmsTaxes.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). The NSSF is the trade association 
of the gun industry. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Hannah E. Shearer & Allison S. Anderman, Analyzing Gun-Violence-
Prevention Taxes Under Emerging Firearm Fee Jurisprudence, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
157, 171–73 (2018) (discussing the court opinions to date upholding the 
constitutionality of gun taxes); see Blocher & Miller, supra note 27, at 335 (“If 
liability for negligence with a weapon, taxes on ammunition, or storage 
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burden is dependent, of course, on how localized the 
hypothetical tax would be. This could merely be an argument 
for federal versus state taxes, and state/regional taxes versus 
municipal. The second point brings up the complex issue of 
the price relationship between legal markets and black 
markets, discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The federal tax regime for firearms is longstanding, 
unchanging, and outdated. Firearm manufacturers pay a ten 
percent tax, called the Firearms and Ammunition Excise Tax 
(FAET), on every handgun produced, and eleven percent on 
ammunition and other firearms, such as hunting rifles.46 A 
separate statute, the National Firearms Act,47 places a $200 
manufacturer tax on each machine gun or short-barrel 
shotgun produced or imported, a figure unchanged since its 
enactment in 1934.48 The manufacturers and importers pay 
these taxes, so presumably they factor into the retail price 
that consumers pay for a gun purchase. The Treasury 
Department’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 
(TTB) has administered FAET, the tax on most guns and 
ammunition, since the Homeland Security reforms of 2002–
2003.49 The revenue collected goes to the Fish and Wildlife 
Commission, which holds it in a trust account administered 
on behalf of the states to support hunting and conservation 
 
requirements for weapons are historically indicated, then they cannot be 
‘infringements,’ because there is no corresponding right.”). 
 46. 26 U.S.C. § 4181 (2012) (also known as the Pittman-Robertson Act of 
1919); see also FAET REFERENCE GUIDE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION EXCISE TAX, 
https://www.ttb.gov/firearms/reference_guide.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2019) 
(publication of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau of the Department 
of the Treasury) [hereinafter “FAET Reference Guide”]. 
 47. 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (2012). 
 48. See id. The Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges to the 
National Firearms Act in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) and 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). For a post-Heller decision 
upholding the NFA, see United States v. Cox, 906 F.3d 1170, 1178–88 (2018). 
 49. See FAET Reference Guide, supra note 46, at Section I.A. 
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activities.50 The FAET generated over $761 million in 
revenue in 2017.51 The NFA taxes on machine guns, 
silencers, and so forth, generates less than one-tenth of that 
amount, and revenues go to the general treasury fund.52 
These constitute the entirety of the federal taxation regime 
for firearms and ammunition, besides the $90 annual 
licensing fee paid by authorized gun dealers.53 A bill 
currently moving through Congress, the Gun Violence and 
Safe Communities Act, would raise the FAET rates to 20 
percent on guns and 50 percent on ammunition.54 
In recent years, two municipalities have imposed local 
taxes imposing a $25 tax on every firearm: Cook County, IL55 
and Seattle, WA.56 As of 2016, Seattle also has a tax (up to 
five cents per round) on ammunition.57 Both of these local 
taxes were primarily for generating revenue;58 Seattle’s tax 
has already survived a court challenge.59 Pennsylvania adds 
a $3 surcharge on guns subject to the state sales tax,60 and 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. R. ELIOT CRAFTON, JANE G. GRAVELLE & WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., GUNS, EXCISE TAXES, WILDLIFE RESTORATION, AND THE NATIONAL 
FIREARMS ACT 1 (2018). 
 52. Id. at 7. 
 53. See id. at 7–8 (discussing the Gun Control Act of 1968, especially 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 921 et seq). 
 54. H.R. 5103, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2018) (sponsored by Rep. Danny Davis (D-
IL)). 
 55. COOK COUNTY FIREARM AND FIREARM AMMUNITION TAX, https://www.cook 
countyil.gov/service/firearm-and-firearm-ammunition-tax (last visited Oct. 19, 
2019). 
 56. RAND, supra note 29, at 241 (discussing firearm and ammunition taxes). 
 57. Id. at 241. 
 58. See id.; see also Robert McClelland, New Gun and Ammo Taxes Sound 
Like Promising Ways To Reduce Gun Violence. But There Are Problems, TAXVOX 
(May 24, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/new-gun-and-ammo-
taxes-sound-promising-ways-reduce-gun-violence-there-are-problems. 
 59. Watson v. Seattle, 401 P.3d 1, 14 (Wash. 2017). 
 60. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6111.2 (2019). 
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Tennessee has a ten-cent excise tax on shotgun shells.61 A 
federal judge struck down a statute in the Northern Mariana 
Islands that imposed a $1,000 gun tax in 2016.62 Local tax 
experiments are rare because most states now have statutes 
that preempt such initiatives by municipalities.63 There is 
zero scholarship to date on Tieboutian competition with local 
excise taxes of firearms. 
It is unknown how much taxes reduce gun violence or 
inhibit gun purchases, but this is an important question to 
answer. As RAND researchers put it in 2018, 
“[u]nderstanding the potential consequences of higher taxes 
on guns and ammunition is important both for policy 
considerations moving forward and for assessing laws that 
increase the effective price of legal gun purchases, such as 
permit-to-purchase law.”64 This is mostly a question of 
elasticity or price sensitivity among purchasers—a subject 
heavily studied in other areas of taxation, but not with guns. 
The RAND report explains the frustrating lack of data and 
 
 61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-1-401 (2019). 
 62. Murphy v. Guerrero, No. 1:14-CV-00026, 2016 WL 5508998 (D. N. Mar. I. 
Sept. 28. 2016) (striking down most of C.N.M.I. Public Law 19-42). 
 63. See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 1995, 1997–99 (2018); see also Blocher, Firearm Localism, supra note 27, at 
133. For some older empirical research on gun sale interactions across different 
locales, see Anthony A. Braga, Garen J. Wintemute, Glenn L. Pierce, Philip J. 
Cook, & Greg Ridgeway, Interpreting the Empirical Evidence on Illegal Gun 
Market Dynamics, 89 J. URB. HEALTH 779 (2012) (finding that “criminals rely 
upon a diverse set of illegal diversion pathways to acquire guns, gun traffickers 
usually divert small numbers of guns, newer guns are diverted through close-to-
retail diversions from legal firearms commerce, and that a diverse set of gun 
trafficking indicators are needed to identify and shut down gun trafficking 
pathways.”); Leo H. Kahane, Understanding the Interstate Export of Crime Guns: 
A Gravity Model Approach, 31 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 618 (2012); Daniel W. 
Webster, Jon S. Vernick, & Maria T. Bulzacchelli, Effects of State-Level Firearm 
Seller Accountability Policies on Firearm Trafficking, 86 J. URB. HEALTH 525 
(2009); see also Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, Sudhir A. Venkatesh & Anthony A. 
Braga, Underground Gun Markets, 117 ECON. J. F588 (2007); Philip J. Cook, 
Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 59, 88–90 (1995). 
 64. RAND, supra note 29, at 241. 
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research: 
Several factors complicate evaluation of the price sensitivity of 
demand for guns or ammunition. First, because few policy changes 
have substantially influenced the price of firearms or ammunition, 
research has faced insufficient variation to empirically estimate the 
price responsiveness of various participants in gun markets. 
Second, in the absence of exogenous price shocks, researchers 
cannot disentangle changes in consumer demand that are driven by 
changes in price from changes in price that are driven by changes 
in consumer demand. And third, the market for firearms and 
ammunition is highly differentiated, and there are no publicly 
available gun or ammunition price data over a sufficient period to 
support policy analysis. A few sources provided information on 
national average prices of guns and ammunition, but these 
averages obscured notable price variation across jurisdictions and 
offered only a rough approximation of the retail prices facing 
consumers. Thus, these data have generally been used to evaluate 
how demand shocks influence prices and not to estimate how 
responsive consumers are to changes in prices. 65 
In addition, there is uncertainty about the effects that 
taxation have on both legal secondary markets (private sales 
between acquaintances) and black markets. In theory, price 
increases in a primary legal market (for any item) should 
affect both secondary markets and black markets—driving 
up prices there as well—but we need more research to 
quantify this. For example, news reports suggest that new 
firearm sales plummeted in Seattle after the impositions of 
its $25 tax,66 which almost certainly contributed to the 
disappointing revenue compared to earlier projections, but 
there is a correlation-causation problem. It is unclear 
whether gun ownership declined, or if purchasers shifted to 
private individual sales, or shifted out of town.67 RAND’s 
 
 65. Id. at 242. 
 66. Dan Springer, Seattle Gun Tax Failure? Firearm Sales Plummet, Violence 
Spikes After Law Passes, FOX NEWS (June 15, 2017) https://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/seattle-gun-tax-failure-firearm-sales-plummet-violence-spikes-after-law 
-passes. 
 67. Joseph R. Buoscio Jr., Violence Taxes: New Way to Recoup and Prevent the 
Costs of Gun Violence? Or New Method to Destroy Business and Competitiveness?, 
15 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 81 (2016) (arguing that local taxes merely drive 
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report states that a few empirical studies suggest that 
hunters are relatively insensitive to increases in license 
fees,68 only one of the three articles they cite appears to be 
an empirical study,69 and finds inelasticity only for American 
hunters wealthy enough to travel abroad for hunting 
trips70—the other two are purely theoretical models.71 In 
contrast, the Seattle experiment suggests that many other 
purchasers are sensitive to gun price increases. As the RAND 
report concludes, “[o]verall, we currently have little 
empirical evidence to indicate how taxation would influence 
firearm-related outcomes, such as violent crime or suicides. 
Nor is there evidence establishing how taxing firearms or 
ammunition would affect the gun industry, defensive gun 
use, or recreational gun use.”72 
As of the date of this writing, I could find only three 
published law review articles focusing on this topic,73 none of 
 
purchasers to other locales or to Internet sellers). 
 68. RAND, supra note 29, at 243. 
 69. Lili Sun, G. Cornelis Van Kooten, & Graham M. Voss, Demand for Wildlife 
Hunting in British Columbia, 53 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. 25 (2005) (empirical study 
suggesting that hunting licenses charged by foreign jurisdictions on American 
hunters visiting there are insensitive to price but vary instead on U.S. income 
fluctuations). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Neelam Poudyal, Seong Hoon Cho & J. M. Bowker, Demand for Resident 
Hunting in the Southeastern United States, 13 HUM. DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE 158 
(2008) (positing, through modeling rather than empirical study, that hunters 
have a margin of inelasticity to license fee increases); Mario F. Teisl, Kevin J. 
Boyle & Richard E. Record Jr., License‐Sales Revenues: Understanding Angler 
and Hunter Reactions to Changes in License Prices, 4 HUM. DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE 
1, 1–2 (1999) (suggesting that across-the-board increases in hunting license fees 
is a less strategic way to generate state revenue than fees tailored to the 
individual hunter’s price sensitivity). 
 72. RAND, supra note 29, at 243. 
 73. Buoscio, supra note 67, at 83; Shearer & Anderman, supra note 45, at 157 
(concluding that most proposed gun-violence-prevention taxes are 
constitutional); see generally Asha Rangappa, The Cost of Freedom: Using the Tax 
Power to Limit Personal Arsenals, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 17 (Sept. 
23, 2013, 2:15 PM), https://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/cost-freedom-using-tax-power 
-limit-personal-aresenals; Allison Speaker, Excise Taxes on a Fundamental 
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which are empirical or even theoretically rigorous (they are 
advocacy or “idea” pieces); an additional forthcoming article 
proposes a firearm tax to fund a victim’s compensation 
fund.74 One published article devotes a section to ridiculing 
Pigouvian taxes on firearms.75 The dearth of high-quality 
research or academic commentary is unfortunate, given the 
number of law professors who have specialized knowledge in 
excise taxes, sales taxes, use taxes, and special corporate tax 
penalties—all of which could be transferrable, to some 
extent, to firearm sales and manufacturing. 
Tax salience is a subject that has far-reaching 
implications for gun policy, and a rich academic literature 
has developed in the last decade on salience in other areas of 
taxation.76 As noted above, the historic pattern for firearm 
 
Right: Do Excise Taxes on Firearms Survive in a Post-Heller World?, 26 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 317 (2016). Additionally, from outside the law review 
sphere, one non-empirical economics article attempts to model some of the effects, 
but reaches extremely tentative conclusions. Isaac Ehrlich & Tetsuya Saito, 
Taxing Guns vs. Taxing Crime: An Application of the “Market for Offenses Model”, 
32 J. POL’Y MODELING 670, 671, 687–89 (2010). 
 74. See also Samuel D. Brunson, Paying for Gun Violence, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3256473. 
 75. Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. 1673, 1677–78 (2015). 
 76. On salience and taxation, see John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, 
Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1266–68 
(2018); Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory 
and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1145–46 (2009) (arguing that tax salience 
impacts elasticity of demand); Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax 
Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969 (2009) (presenting evidence that the salience of a tax 
increases the elasticity of demand among commuters on a toll road); Brian Galle, 
Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 67 TAX L. REV. 53, 54 (2013); David Gamage, On 
the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative Mechanisms and Limiting 
Factors, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 175–76 (2013); David Gamage & Darien 
Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 
65 TAX L. REV. 19, 20 (2011); Jacob Goldin, Note, Sales Tax Not Included: 
Designing Commodity Taxes for Inattentive Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258 (2012) 
(arguing that salience is essential for modifying consumer behavior); Andrew T. 
Hayahsi, The Legal Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443 (2014) 
(investigating salience effects for homeowner property taxes); Hayes R. 
Holderness, The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in State Competition for 
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taxation in the United States has been a manufacturer’s 
excise, the FAET, which presumably impacts retail prices for 
purchasers, but is the least salient form of tax. This under-
salience may explain in political terms why the tax has 
remained so stable (unchanged for several decades), despite 
the partisan divide on firearm policy, and why the tax has 
had no obvious effect on consumer behavior. In contrast, the 
retail excise taxes on firearms and ammunition in Chicago 
and Seattle are hyper-salient, at least politically, and may 
trigger not only price sensitivity in consumers, but also 
organized boycotts among the community of would-be 
purchasers. It would be useful and informative to our public 
discourse to have empirical studies about the marginal 
effects of manufacturer excise tax increases. At what 
threshold would incremental increases in FAET rates impact 
consumer decisions? What effect do manufacturer excise 
taxes, at the margins, have on the manufacturers’ decisions 
about productivity and supply, their capacity to fund 
lobbyists, or shareholder decisions about divestment? Would 
more pervasive retail excise taxes on firearms do more to 
reduce gun prevalence and gun violence than manufacturer 
taxes, because they are more salient to purchasers, or would 
they be less effective, due to their political salience? 
Regarding retail excise taxes, is there a threshold percentage 
(identified from studying excise taxes on other products) that 
triggers observable price sensitivity or elasticity, or a knee of 
the curve that triggers a significant market constriction? 
The question of salience for retail-versus-manufacturer 
excise taxes overlaps with questions about Tiebout-model 
competition between jurisdictions.77 For retail excise taxes 
 
Businesses, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091 (2017) (applying salience to Tieboutian 
competition); Rachelle Holmes Perkins, Salience and Sin: Designing Taxes in the 
Sin Era, 2014 BYU L. REV. 143, 144 (2014); Peter C. Ordeshook, Property Tax 
Consciousness, 34 PUB. CHOICE 285 (1979) (finding no salience effect for property 
mortgage payments including property taxes); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the 
Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2011). 
 77. For discussion of tax salience in the Tiebout context, see Reuven S. Avi-
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on guns and ammunition, at the state or local level, would 
the Tiebout competition model predict a race to the bottom, 
in which jurisdictions are afraid to adopt taxes they 
otherwise would due to the loss in business? Or would the 
model suggest a race to the top, where jurisdictions compete 
for policies that lower gun violence? I cannot find a single law 
review article addressing this question as a general 
proposition, but a Tieboutian race-to-the-bottom scenario 
would be a powerful argument for federal retail taxation. 
Scholars conversant in Tieboutian analysis could also help 
inform us about whether state preemption statutes, which 
bar municipalities from adopting local taxes or restrictions 
pertaining to firearms, arise from state-level concerns about 
a race to the bottom or a race to the top. Some have suggested 
that it is neither—that the preemption laws instead arise 
from the inherent political tension between the rural 
districts and the urban centers in many states, and that the 
urban-versus-rural conflict is behind the political gridlock on 
gun policy in general. 
Another question that merits more commentary from tax 
law professors is the Pigouvian nature of gun taxes, both the 
extant federal taxes and potential state or local taxes—that 
is, whether this is a “sin tax,” designed to discourage 
activities that impose externalities on society.78 The NFA tax 
on machine guns and silencers (sometimes known as the 
“transfer tax”) was indisputably Pigouvian, designed to 
make the weapons completely unaffordable at the time. On 
the other hand, the FAET (10% on handguns, 11% on rifles 
and ammo) is less clear, because the statute earmarks the 
revenue from the tax for the promotion of wildlife 
 
Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1626–28 (2000); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. 
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical 
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 416–18 (2005). 
 78. For example, David Hemenway has suggested that “government 
authorities could tax the sales of the current lethal handguns or subsidize 
production of the less lethal weapons.” HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 140. 
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conservation and sports hunting. It is unclear whether its 
original purpose was primarily to raise revenue for good 
uses, or to discourage sales of dangerous weapons, or both. 
Seattle claimed that its tax was primarily for raising 
revenue, but the revenue disappointed, as the tax drove 
down the sales volume. Pigouvian taxes often run into this 
problem—advocates of a sin tax tout the revenue that it will 
generate for the jurisdiction, but the tax disincentivizes the 
activity enough to suppress the tax revenues below expected 
levels. Pigouvian taxes also involve enforcement and 
monitoring costs that policymakers may not appreciate ex 
ante. From a legal standpoint, the more explicitly a 
legislature frames a gun tax as a “sin tax,” and the more the 
tax falls on individuals rather than manufacturing firms, the 
more likely it seems that a Second Amendment challenge to 
the law would find traction, though most of the Second 
Amendment challenges to gun laws after Heller have proved 
unsuccessful. 
There is lively debate in the top law reviews lately about 
the merits and drawbacks of Pigouvian taxes,79 their 
effectiveness at changing consumer behavior (bounded by 
inelasticity of demand), implementation costs versus 
revenues, over- and under-inclusiveness, the sticky question 
of government paternalism, and so forth—but so far there 
has been no empirical research about Pigouvian gun taxes, 
unfortunately. One forthcoming article by Samuel Brunson 
advocates for a gun ownership tax to raise revenue for 
 
 79. See Fleischer, supra note 75 (against Pigouvian taxes); Jonathan S. Masur 
& Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93 (2015) 
(enthusiastically advocating for more Pigouvian taxes); see also Giuseppe Dari-
Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect, 26 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365 (2009); Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . Or Nudge?: 
Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837 (2014); Brian Galle, The 
Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 797 (2012); Aaron M. Levine & Joshua C. Macey, Dodd-Frank Is 
a Pigouvian Regulation, 127 YALE L.J. 1336 (2018); Nadav Shoked, Cities Taxing 
New Sins: The Judicial Embrace of Local Excise Taxation, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 801 
(2018). 
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compensating victims but disclaims “true” Pigouvian policy 
of deterring gun purchases.80 Nevertheless, there remains 
the unanswered problem of the tax being self-defeating as a 
revenue source. From the standpoint of disincentivizing 
socially costly behavior, however, some “sin taxes” have been 
successful. “Abundant evidence shows the effectiveness of 
one specific policy, alcohol taxation, which reduces the 
overall population level of alcohol consumption and alcohol-
related problems.”81 Even consumers that we think of as 
impulsive—youth, alcoholics, and even heavy drinkers—
demonstrate price sensitivity, and consume less when 
alcohol taxes are higher.82 
Black markets are a problem for Pigouvian taxes 
(consumers can avoid the tax via illegal providers),83 and are 
a special problem for gun taxes, because guns are a durable 
good that black market vendors can repurchase and resell 
many times (obviously this is less true of ammunition), a 
frequently made point in debates about gun control. The 
durable nature of guns also means that legal secondary 
markets (private exchanges and barter) can undermine the 
success of a Pigouvian gun tax—but the legal secondary 
market can also undermine the black market at the same 
time, which makes the question more complex. The 
secondary market problems (both legal and illegal) with 
Pigouvian taxes are not necessarily insurmountable or 
absolute. Depending on the circumstances, effective law 
enforcement can hamper illegal markets,84 as can voluntary 
 
 80. See generally Brunson, supra note 74. 
 81. HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 195. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See generally UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. ILLICIT TOBACCO MARKET: 
CHARACTERISTICS, POLICY CONTEXT, AND LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES (Peter Reuter & Malay Majmundar eds., 2015). 
 84. See id. at 139–60 (describing and evaluating enforcement interventions in 
illegal tobacco markets). 
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compliance by the citizenry.85 Effective marketing 
campaigns by manufacturers and retailers undermine legal 
secondary markets, winning over customers to new product 
sales instead of the used/pre-owned private exchanges.86 
Currently, many consumers still buy new firearms (a few 
million per year), even when used models are widely 
available at discount prices. Speculators—those who buy up 
an item before an excise tax or ban goes into effect, and who 
then hoard it to achieve monopoly rents later—can have an 
enormous impact on the supply and prices in secondary 
markets, both illegal and legal, and in theory could collapse 
a fragile black market. The complex effects of taxes on the 
relationship between primary and secondary markets is a 
topic that tax experts could readily address—but they have 
not yet done so. Black markets for guns may also have a self-
defeating feature of making the guns a consumable good 
rather than a durable good, if criminals do not want to 
purchase a gun already linked to other crimes. 
Tobacco black markets can provide instructive examples, 
even though cigarettes are consumables, because the black 
markets exist primarily, if not entirely, to avoid cigarette 
taxes.87 According to a comprehensive study by the National 
Academy of Sciences, within the United States, the illegal 
tobacco market consists of bootlegging cigarettes from low-
tax states to high-tax states,88 and this could be an issue with 
 
 85. See id. at 130–35 (describing the effectiveness of public education 
campaigns in reducing black markets for tobacco). 
 86. See id. at 174–88 (proposing a similar approach to address black markets 
in tobacco). 
 87. Id. at 1 (“In comparison with other consumer products, cigarettes are 
currently subject to high taxes in the United States and in most other countries. 
The high rates of taxation and the large tax differentials between jurisdictions 
increase incentives for tax evasion and tax avoidance and contribute to existing 
illicit tobacco markets.”). 
 88. See id. at 2–3. Interestingly, the size of the illegal tobacco market is 
difficult to determine, as with firearms, due to similar data deficits and rival 
methodologies for calculating. See id. at 4–5. 
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state or local firearms taxes as well. Internationally, there is 
also a problem with illegal/unregistered production, 
counterfeiting of expensive foreign brands, and large-scale 
smuggling of imports89—issues that are less likely to affect 
the American domestic gun market, given that Heller 
eliminated the possibility of an outright gun ban. One of the 
most effective policy interventions to combat domestic illegal 
tobacco markets is to regulate and monitor (control) the 
supply chain—manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.90 
This requires cooperation and coordination between various 
levels of government and various agencies within each level, 
which historically has proved difficult with tobacco,91 but 
with firearms would require significant changes in current 
laws that prohibit such coordination and information 
sharing, between federal agencies and state-federal 
counterparts. Digital stamps, and tracking/tracing is very 
effective when implemented consistently.92 Tax 
harmonization, of course, eliminates the primary motivation 
for the illegal tobacco market,93 but in the United States, this 
requires a complete federalization of the taxes for that 
market, which presents both constitutional and political 
hurdles with both tobacco and firearms. Public education 
campaigns have also proved effective in the United States at 
reducing tobacco use generally, but the campaigns have not 
focused on discouraging illegal markets.94 Other countries 
have run education campaigns to discourage the public from 
buying illegal cigarettes, and the effectiveness of these 
campaigns requires further study.95 Enforcement of the laws 
 
 89. See id. at 3–5. 
 90. See id. at 111–26. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. at 127–30. 
 94. See id. at 130. 
 95. See id. at 131–36. 
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is crucial—the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
concludes that low enforcement of anti-bootlegging laws in 
the United States has enabled a flourishing illegal market;96 
cigarette enforcement is a low priority for state and federal 
law enforcement agencies. 
The lessons for firearm tax proposals seem clear: federal 
action may be necessary to avoid an interstate bootlegging 
industry. In addition, new tax initiatives, apart from raising 
the current manufacturer’s taxes, would also require a 
strong political commitment to have greater oversight of the 
supply chain, and more consistent enforcement for 
violations. These problems seem endemic to Pigouvian taxes, 
but the NAS has not taken the position that we should 
abandon such tax efforts. Pigouvian taxes on guns have 
promise, even if there are significant challenges for 
implementation. 
Victor Fleischer’s article about Pigouvian taxes devotes 
a few pages to gun taxes, which he portrays unfavorably.97 
His argument rests on the wide variation he sees in the 
marginal social cost of different gun owners—a hypothetical 
good citizen (whom he describes as a not-so-hypothetical law 
professor and Second Amendment scholar named Eugene) 
and a hypothetical cocaine dealer named John, with the gun 
tax affecting everyone equally.98 Fleischer argues that the 
former type of gun owner poses no social costs with his gun 
ownership (in fact, he asserts that there are positive 
externalities), while the latter poses high social costs 
(violence and so forth), but he is both less common and less 
responsive to the proposed tax.99 This is the familiar 
argument that gun regulations merely take guns away from 
the virtuous, law-abiding citizens, and leave them in the 
 
 96. See id. at 140–58. 
 97. See Fleischer, supra note 75, at 1677–79. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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hands of the vicious, lawless criminals.100 Assuming the 
“good” potential gun owners are the majority—a moral 
majority—and the criminals a smaller minority, the social 
costs of the policy (to the moral majority) far outweigh the 
benefits, that is, deterring criminals.101 
There are several problems with this line of argument. 
The first is the commonplace but entirely false dichotomy 
between the “good” people in our society and the “criminals.” 
Our hypothetical law-abiding, law-expounding professor 
named Eugene may seem perfectly congenial and harmless 
at the moment, but no one is permanently immune from 
moral lapses, or from developing a substance abuse problem 
(highly correlated with gun suicides and homicides), or 
experiencing a series of financial setbacks that lead to 
desperation, or even somewhat unreasonable, mistaken acts 
of self-defense. This risk, even if less than probable, still 
constitutes a social cost of “good” citizens owning guns—more 
of those “good citizens” resort to violent or illegal activity 
than we like to admit to ourselves. And more of those 
“criminals” are the troubled teenage children or siblings of 
law-abiding “good” citizens than we like to admit—instead, 
the gun discourse in our culture persistently invokes 
“criminals” as “other.” In other words, I worry that there are 
no friendly civilians, at least in terms of potentials. 
Moreover, an estimated half million guns per year disappear 
from theft and enter the illegal gun market, and this is also 
a social cost of the moral, law-abiding citizen politely 
exercising his Second Amendment rights. There exists an 
elaborate distribution infrastructure for lawful gun 
purchases—a wide network of licensed retailers, 
manufacturers’ regional distribution centers, gun shows, and 
online orders of replacement parts, plus the surrounding 
advertising and marketing campaigns to let consumers know 
 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
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about the availability and pricing of products. This market 
infrastructure, for all its merits, simultaneously and 
inevitably facilitates the availability of guns to the black 
market, through straw purchasers, backdoor illegal sales 
from authorized dealers, and so forth. There is also a moral 
hazard problem—a person who buys a gun for self-defense 
then feels safer, even empowered, and is therefore more 
likely to take risks (say, visit high-crime neighborhoods he 
would have avoided if unarmed), or respond more 
aggressively to threats. Our public discourse often blames 
the “mentally ill” for the high-profile incidents of gun 
violence, with the purported solution being that we should 
focus on keeping guns away from “crazy people.” But I worry 
that owning or carrying a gun makes even the best of us 
slightly less rational, a little more brash or overconfident or 
“crazy” than we otherwise would be. The moral hazard 
involved in arming oneself is a social cost that offsets (to an 
unknown extent) the social benefits of being able to prevent 
a crime. 
I have the opposite set of concerns about our imaginary, 
demonic “criminals” who magically have an endless supply 
of cheap, black market guns regardless of the restrictions or 
levies placed on the primary gun market. First, I do not 
believe that most criminals who obtain a gun illegally have 
set out to murder people—I think many want one merely as 
a precaution, in case they need to defend themselves 
unexpectedly, but then things go wrong. Thus, it is not clear 
how many of the current pool of illegal gun purchasers are so 
determined to obtain a gun that they are indifferent to 
changes in the supply or price; many may forego the firearm, 
and use a less lethal weapon (a knife, etc.) if the price or 
transaction costs for obtaining an illegal gun rose 
significantly. We do not have empirical evidence proving that 
criminal demand for guns is inelastic. Moreover, criminal 
defendants are disproportionately poor, and the regressive 
effects of price increases on the poor (the marginal impact) 
should make criminals more sensitive to prices than the rest 
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of the population, not less. The regressive nature of 
Pigouvian taxes is a common criticism, but in the case of 
guns and criminals, the regressive aspect of it might be 
desirable, given the correlation between violent crime and 
poverty.102 On the other hand, to the extent that the demand 
for firearms or ammunition is inelastic—not price 
sensitive—then a tax on these items can be an effective 
revenue source for the public fisc, unlike many other items 
subject to Pigouvian taxes. 
Early in his hypothetical, Fleischer asserts that 
hypothetical Eugene’s gun ownership “arguably creates 
positive social externalities for his neighbors.”103 How so? Do 
Eugene’s neighbors want him to be a neighborhood vigilante, 
brandishing his weapons at anyone he perceives to be 
committing a crime against his neighbor’s property? If 
Eugene’s neighbors have an acrimonious relationship with 
him—say, over the neighbor’s dog that barks too much, or 
Eugene’s loud music, or their opposing party yard signs 
during election season—would they view Eugene’s household 
arsenal as a benefit to them? If Fleischer’s stereotypical 
portrayal of the criminal is accurate—that is, a violent man 
determined to obtain firearms, and willing to pay any price—
then neighbors may see Eugene’s gun collection as an 
attractive nuisance, a treasure trove for any burglar patient 
enough to strike when Eugene is not home. Rather than 
scaring criminals away from the neighborhood, a stockpile of 
weapons seems just as likely to draw them in. 
Returning to the main point of this section: taxation of 
firearms and ammunition is a subject that deserves far more 
academic attention than it has received, especially from 
those with expertise in tax law and policy. Our public 
 
 102. In fact, given the demographics of gun ownership, a firearm or 
ammunition tax might actually be a luxury tax, rather than a sin tax, and have 
redistributive effects. 
 103. Fleischer, supra note 75, at 1677. 
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discourse would benefit from a better understanding of both 
the current tax regime with its effects, and well theorized 
proposals for increases, shifting the point of taxation, and so 
forth. 
B. Defensive Gun Use 
Self-defense touches every part of the gun policy 
debate—it is a primary motivation for handgun 
ownership,104 the core of the NRA’s arguments, and has 
become the postmodern reading of the Second 
Amendment.105 It is perhaps the largest empirical hole in 
public discourse on guns106—nobody truly knows how often 
gun owners use their weapons to stop a crime or defend 
themselves,107 and therefore we have many baseless 
assumptions and speculation about how effective guns are 
 
 104. Kate Masters, Fear of Other People Is Now the Primary Motivation for 
American Gun Ownership, a Landmark Survey Finds, THE TRACE (Sept. 19, 
2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/09/harvard-gun-ownership-study-self-
defense/. 
 105. See, e.g., Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 2017), 
cert. den. 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (“After Heller, this court and other federal courts 
of appeals have held that the Second Amendment protects ancillary rights 
necessary to the realization of the core right to possess a firearm for self-
defense.”); Binderup v. Att’y General, 836 F.3d 336, 363 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting 
self-defense is “the right at the ‘core’ of the Second Amendment,” citing District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629–30 (2008)); Ezell v. Cty. of Chicago, 651 
F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (deciding based on “the core right to possess firearms 
for self-defense”); Bridgeville Rifle & Pistol Club, Ltd. v. Small, 176 A.3d 632, 646 
(Del.  2017) (“Heller made clear that the Second Amendment protects an inherent 
right of self-defense.”); People v. Wilder, 861 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2014) (“The Second Amendment . . . guarantee[s] an individual ‘a right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense.’”); see also BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 27, at 
72–84 (discussing the constitutionalization of self-defense through Heller and 
subsequent judicial opinions). 
 106. See RAND, supra note 29, at 8–9; David Hemenway, Survey Research and 
Self-Defense Gun Use: An Explanation of Extreme Overestimates, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1430, 1431 (1997); see also David Hemenway & Deborah Azrael, 
The Relative Frequency of Offensive and Defensive Gun Uses: Results from a 
National Survey, 15 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 257, 269 (2000). 
 107. See RAND, supra note 29, at 8–9; Hemenway, supra note 106, at 1431.  
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for self-defense compared to other measures, or whether the 
social welfare gains from defensive use outweigh, or even 
offset, the social costs of gun prevalence.108 The more-guns-
less-crime trope implies that gun ownership itself—in the 
aggregate—prevents crimes, crowding out analysis of actual 
instances of gun use.109 
RAND has acknowledged this in emphatic, 
disheartening terms—all the information circulating about 
salutary gun usage is incorrect, or at best unreliable.110 
Earlier estimates came from methodologically flawed 
surveys of crime victims (representing a narrow selection of 
crimes), or gun owners themselves, relying on respondents’ 
own opinions about how often their guns have prevented a 
crime.111 In other words, the gun owner’s opinion about 
whether a crime would have otherwise occurred, whether 
their display (or even mere possession?) of a gun thwarted a 
crime, and so on. The surveys do not include responses 
(obviously) from those who used a gun defensively but died 
during the incident.112 RAND researchers identify two yet-
unanswered questions: the true number of defensive gun use 
incidents per year (we still lack a good method to count such 
incidents), and whether defensive gun use is effective 
compared to other responses or defensive measures against 
 
 108. See RAND, supra note 29, at 8–9. See also FIRMIN DEBARANDER, DO GUNS 
MAKE US FREE? 75–88 (2015) (discussing in detail the historical ascent and 
consequences of stand-your-ground-laws). 
 109. See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, The Latest Misfires in Support of 
the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2003). See 
generally Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less 
Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003). 
 110. See RAND, supra note 29, at 275–80 (describing the widely ranging 
estimates and the methodologies used in each published study, most or all of 
which depend on self-reporting in surveys). 
 111. See id. For an excellent overview of the leading work in this area, and the 
failings of each, see HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 66–69. 
 112. RAND, supra note 29, at 275–80. 
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crime.113 After surveying all extant studies, they conclude 
that there is no conclusive evidence on the latter question.114 
Finally, the RAND researchers note some other issues that 
skew results in the studies: whether the would-be criminal 
also had a firearm (RAND suggests many of the “effective” 
defensive gun use scenarios involved an unarmed criminal 
and gun-wielding potential victim), and whether defensive 
gun use occurs only in the subset of circumstances where the 
gun owner has a chance to draw or display the weapon, which 
may correlate to other advantageous factors (e.g., advance 
warning of the crime, an assailant distracted by bystanders, 
police backup available, and so on).115 Relatedly, a certain 
percentage of defensive gun use incidents involve an 
unarmed victim wrestling the firearm from a would-be 
assailant, and turning it on the perpetrator;116 for purposes 
of researching the social benefits of gun ownership, it would 
seem that such incidents should count separately from those 
where a gun owner uses their own weapon. 
The incomplete data about defensive gun use currently 
leaves open the possibility that it is incredibly rare. For 
example, significant empirical survey evidence that self-
defense with weapons other than firearms occurs far more 
often than defensive gun use; baseball bats have more 
reported uses in successful self-defense than guns.117 In 
addition, as John Donohue et al. recently observed: 
 
 113. See id. at 273. 
 114. See id. at 284–85. 
 115. See id. at 283–84; see also State v. Scott, 819 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2018) 
(stating that a reasonable mistake can justify lethal force for self-defense); COOK 
& GOSS, supra note 21, at 17–20. 
 116. See, e.g., Chloe Alexander, Tow truck driver wrestles gun from robbery 




 117. HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 77. 
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In any event, the use of a gun by a concealed carry permit holder to 
thwart a crime is a statistically rare phenomenon. Even with the 
enormous stock of guns in the United States, the vast majority of 
the time that someone is threatened with violent crime no gun will 
be wielded defensively. A five-year study of such violent 
victimizations in the United States found that victims reported 
failing to defend or to threaten the criminal with a gun 99.2 percent 
of the time—this in a country with 300 million guns in civilian 
hands [(citation omitted)]. Adding 16 million permit holders who 
often dwell in low-crime areas may not yield many opportunities for 
effective defensive use for the roughly 1 percent of Americans who 
experience a violent crime in a given year, especially since criminals 
can attack in ways that preempt defensive measures.118 
Some claims of defensive gun use are, in fact, illegal.119 
Some involve mutual combat (e.g., an argument between 
relatives or neighbors escalates to a violent encounter),120 or 
 
 118. Donohue et al., supra note 25, at 202. 
 119. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 87 N.E.3d 353, 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) 
(concluding that a mistaken belief of being in danger negated a self-defense 
claim); State v. Guillory, 229 So. 3d 949, 964 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (“A person who 
is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense 
unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that 
his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue 
the conflict.”); State v. Fitts, 803 S.E.2d 654, 654 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (“Defendant 
did not intend to kill victim when he discharged firearm into victim’s vehicle, and 
thus defendant was not entitled to jury instruction on perfect self-defense.”); 
State v. Chandler, 99 N.E.3d 1255, 1259 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (affirming that the 
defendant could not assert a Castle Doctrine self-defense claim in felonious 
assault prosecution with regard to a shooting at a common area of an apartment 
complex). 
 120. See, e.g., Goodson v. State, 824 S.E.2d 371, 372 (Ga. 2019) (concluding that 
the defendant’s claim of self-defense was unavailing when he shot victim (an 
argumentative neighbor) as he turned to flee, and continued shooting after the 
victim was on the ground and no longer posed any threat); Mack v. State, 428 
P.3d 326, 328 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018) (concluding that although the defendant 
claimed that when an argument started with the victim, he mistakenly thought 
the victim was armed, and “[a]n aggressor, or a person who voluntarily enters a 
situation armed, cannot claim self-defense.”); Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 
592, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (concluding that the defendant who shot the 
unarmed attacker who was arguing with and hitting his father in front of their 
house had an ineffective claim of self-defense or defense of others); Farrow v. 
State, 437 P.3d 809, 818 (Wyo. 2019) (“[T]wo individuals who mutually agree to 
fight are both considered aggressors, making a self-defense theory unavailable to 
either of them.”). For a concise academic discussion of the escalation problem, see 
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defensive gun use by someone who cannot legally possess or 
use a firearm (e.g., convicted felons and others under 
statutory prohibitions).121 Similarly, imagine an individual 
whose family member alleges some mistreatment or threats 
from a bully (or romantic rival, or violent ex-boyfriend, or 
loan shark), and who accosts the bully later, warning him at 
gunpoint to “leave my family/daughter/girlfriend alone.”122 
This would be a crime in every state, but many gun owners 
may consider this a legitimate instance of their gun 
preventing a crime.123 In a study in 2000, researchers at the 
Harvard Injury Control Research Center collected 
summaries of defensive gun use incidents and sent them to 
state judges in California, Pennsylvania, and 
Massachusetts—who deemed about half of the incidents as 
illegal or contrary public policy, even when they assumed all 
the individuals legally possessed their firearms in the first 
place.124 As one Miami police chief observed, “citizens feel 
threatened all the time, whether it’s from the approach of an 
aggressive panhandler or a squeegee pest or even just 
walking down a poorly lighted street at night. In tightly 
 
HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 71. 
 121. See, e.g., Stanfield v. State, 269 So.3d 1188, 1190 (Miss. 2019) (concluding 
that the defendant was a convicted felon, who wrestled to take away an attacker’s 
gun, causied it to fire and kill the assailant, but “self-defense is not a viable 
defense to the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.”); State v. 
Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 402 (Tenn. 2017) (holding that the felon-in-possession 
of firearm was “engaged in unlawful activity” and could not claim valid self-
defense in shooting); see also DEBARANDER, supra note 108, at 85. 
 122. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 96 N.E.3d 74, 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) 
(concluding that the defendant no longer faced danger of imminent harm when 
he shot and killed victim, which negated the defendant’s self-defense claim); see 
also DEBARANDER, supra note 108, at 81. 
 123. See Donohue et al., supra note 25, at 201–06 (recounting tragic incidents, 
starting with the notorious case of Bernard Goetz and Gerald Ung). 
 124. See HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at 72–73. The Challenges of Defining and 
Measuring Defensive Gun Use, RAND CORP. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.rand 
.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/supplementary/defensive-gun-use.html (citing 
David Hemenway et al., Gun Use in the United States: Results from Two National 
Surveys, 6 INJ. PREVENTION 263, 263–67 (2000). 
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congested urban areas, public encounters can be 
threatening.”125 
One promising newer nonprofit project for data collection 
about defensive gun use is the Gun Violence Archive 
(“GVA”),126 “an online archive of gun violence incidents 
collected from over 6,500 law enforcement, media, 
government and commercial sources daily in an effort to 
provide near-real time data about the results of gun 
violence.”127 Most of the items reported come from news 
reports (links provided), which presents both advantages and 
disadvantages for researchers; note that the GVA reports 
only shootings, not incidents where a potential victim 
brandished a firearm to ward off a would-be attacker, thief, 
or intruder. The GVA tallies for reported incidents of 
defensive shootings are 1,887 for 2018; 2,106 for 2017; and 
2,001 for 2016.128 
Empirical researchers in other fields need law professors 
to help define the boundaries before they can plan their 
research.129 Legality or criminality is the first question that 
we in the legal academy must answer for our counterparts in 
other fields (public health, sociology, criminal, political 
science, and risk assessment/insurance actuarial science)—
that is, what types of defensive gun use are legal, as opposed 
to criminal.130 These researchers need the answer framed to 
 
 125. DEBARANDER, supra note 108, at 81. 
 126. See GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, www.gunviolencearchive.org (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2019). This page devoted to day-by-day defensive gun use incidents is 
available at: https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/defensive-use, and is 
kept up-to-date. GVA has no affiliation with other entities or advocacy groups. 
 127. See About, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org 
/about. 
 128. See Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www. 
gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 129. See COOK & GOSS, supra note 21, at 19 (explaining the need for definitions 
before conducting an empirical investigation of defensive gun use). 
 130. But see McGriff v. State, 160 So. 3d 167, 168 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) 
(concluding that the defendant had no duty to retreat before using deadly force 
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help suggest an empirical study design. Law review articles 
often focus on policy suggestions—what we think the law 
should be, what we think courts, legislators, or government 
officials should do about something. The immediate need in 
the area of firearm research, however, is clearer explanation 
of the binary variables that researchers should use in 
designing their studies—descriptively, what factors make 
use of lethal force, or even brandishing a weapon, always 
illegal, or definitely legal, even if these per se categories are 
the exception, not the norm.131 We need to explain, with a 
view to research design, the problem with mistakes of fact in 
self-defense claims, or the duty to use non-lethal force first 
before escalating.132 On the more normative side, law 
professors should weigh in on the question of whether we 
should count a case as legitimate self-defense if the 
individual is a felon,133 or if the type of weapon itself is 
illegal134 (say, a machine gun, a handgun with a silencer, 
 
in self-defense, even if he was engaged in unlawful activity). 
 131. See, e.g., Savage v. State, 166 A.3d 183, 198 (Md. 2017) (concluding that 
expert testimony that defendant would be more likely to perceive himself to be 
facing imminent threat under conditions of chaos and stress, and thus have 
greater difficulty controlling his reactions, was inadmissible under Frye, and 
therefore could not support self-defense claim). 
 132. See COOK & GOSS, supra note 21, at 19–20. 
 133. Compare State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 392–93 (Tenn. 2017) 
(concluding that a felon-in-possession of firearm was therefore “engaged in 
unlawful activity” and could not claim valid self-defense in shooting), with 
Wallace v. State, 216 So. 3d 464, 474 (Ala. 2015) (concluding that a felon in 
possession could raise self-defense, but could not use “stand-your-ground” 
statute), Miles v. State, 162 So. 3d 169, 171–72 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (finding 
that the defendant was not precluded from relying on “Stand Your Ground law” 
to claim that he had shot victim in self-defense, and thus was immune from 
prosecution, even though he was carrying a concealed weapon and was a 
convicted felon in possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting), and People 
v. Dupree, 771 N.W.2d 470, 478–80 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that a felon-
in-possession still has right to raise self-defense in response to murder charge). 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 234 (2010) (concluding 
that under a statute prohibiting the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, the fact that the firearm was a 
machinegun was an element of the offense to be proved to the jury beyond a 
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etc.). 
A second immediate task for legal commentators is to 
explain or translate some of our legal terms of art into factors 
or variables for research design. For example, there is a 
confusing series of Supreme Court cases interpreting the 
terms “use”135 and “carry”136 in firearm-related statutes; 
awareness of the issues with terminology would help 
researchers in the social sciences avoid using the same words 
differently in designing their studies, either in formulating 
survey questions or in explaining their findings. Similarly, 
through grading of offenses and sentencing factors, criminal 
law imputes significance to the fact that a perpetrator 
 
reasonable doubt, rather than a sentencing factor); Castillo v. United States, 530 
U.S. 120, 121 (2000) (concluding that a statute prohibiting the use or carrying of 
a “firearm” in relation to a crime of violence, which increased the penalty when 
weapon used or carried was a “machinegun,” used the word “machinegun” and 
similar words to state an element of a separate, aggravated crime). 
 135. See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 76 (2007) (trading drugs 
for a gun does not “use” a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking 
crimes, within meaning of statute); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 
(1998) (concluding that the petitioner may not challenge whether his plea was 
intelligent, but may appeal on grounds of actual innocence, over confusion 
regarding legal definition of “use” of firearm); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 
137, 143 (1995) (concluding that “use” includes brandishing, displaying, 
bartering, striking with, and firing or attempting to fire a firearm, or even 
referring to a firearm in one’s possession, but does not include the nearby 
concealment of a gun to be at the ready for an imminent confrontation); Smith v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993) (trading a gun for illegal drugs 
constitutes “use” of firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking crime 
within meaning of statute, triggering enhanced penalties for that offense). 
 136. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126–27 (1998) (finding 
that the phrase “carries a firearm” is not limited to carrying of firearms on person, 
but also applies to person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a 
vehicle, which person accompanies). See also Rosemond v. United States, 572 
U.S. 65, 67 (2014) (holding that to aid and abet offense of using firearm during 
federal drug-trafficking offense, defendant must know beforehand that one of his 
confederates will carry a gun); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) 
(finding as to whether defendant had brandished, as opposed to merely carrying, 
firearm in connection with crime of violence, because it would elevate mandatory 
minimum term for firearms offense from five to seven years, was element of 
separate, aggravated offense that had to found by jury). 
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discharged a firearm,137 rather than merely brandishing it, 
and imputes significance to brandishing it versus keeping it 
holstered or hidden.138 These are after-the-fact evaluative 
questions in the legal system, but they are antecedent 
questions for research design. 
C. State Preemption 
At the time of this writing, forty-three states have 
statutes that preempt most local efforts to regulate firearm 
sales, usage, storage, or ownership.139 These laws are part of 
a larger state preemption regime affecting environmental 
regulations, land use controls, Pigouvian taxes or bans on 
sweetened soft drinks, fiscal authority or public employee 
pensions, public bathroom regulations, broadband services, 
and so on—state laws prevent cities or counties from 
adopting their own restrictions or rules about an activity.140 
 
 137. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 571–72 (2009) (holding that 
a 10–year mandatory minimum applies if a gun is discharged in the course of a 
violent or drug trafficking crime, whether on purpose or by accident). See also 
Dean v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1170, 1178 (2017) (permitting the use of 
minimum statutory sentences for gun use in commission of drug offense); United 
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1997) (holding that a statutory five-year 
sentence for using or carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking may not 
run concurrently to other state sentences). 
 138. Legality can also turn on the question of what constitutes “during” the 
commission of a predicate crime. See, e.g., United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 
274–75 (2008) (holding that defendant was carrying explosives contemporaneous 
with the commission of underlying felony of making a false statement to a United 
States customs official, so it was “during” the commission of the crime). 
 139. See VOLSKY, supra note 2, at 62; Preemption of Local Laws, GIFFORDS LAW 
CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/ 
policy-areas/other-laws-policies/preemption-of-local-laws/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2019); Preemption: State by State, GIFFORDS LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/state-law/50-state-summaries/ 
preemption-state-by-state (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). Note that Kristin Goss 
stated that forty-five states had partial or full preemption in early 2005. See 
GOSS, supra note 2, at 164. For further discussion, see COOK & GOSS, supra note 
21, at 108–09. 
 140. See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 1995 (2018); Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of 
2019] SCHOLARSHIP ON FIREARM POLICY 1489 
 
A substantial academic literature has accumulated on the 
topic of state preemption of local rule,141 and a few authors 
have addressed it in the context of firearm regulations.142 
State preemption laws are often a manifestation of the 
tensions between rural and urban voters in many states, 
which in recent decades have aligned themselves with 
partisan positions on a variety of policy matters.143 In the 
context of firearm policy, the urban-rural divide is 
crucial144—handgun violence is mostly an urban problem, 
and city governments seek to reduce gun violence and gun 
prevalence, while gun sports (especially hunting), which 
often involve rifles rather than handguns, are primarily 
rural or suburban phenomena145—but so is the belief that 
handguns are important for self-defense.146 The voting power 
 
Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954 (2019); Bradley Pough, Understanding the Rise 
of Super Preemption in State Legislatures, 34 J.L. & POL. 67 (2018); Erin Adele 
Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 
GEO. L.J. 1469 (2018) [hereinafter Hyper Preemption]; Erin Scharff, Preemption 
and Fiscal Authority, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1270 (2018); Kenneth A. Stahl, 
Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133 (2017); 
Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: State Preemption of Progressive 
Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225 (2017). 
 141. For an overview, see generally Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on 
American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018). 
 142. See generally Blocher, supra note 27; Michael P. O’Shea, Why Firearm 
Federalism Beats Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L.J. Online 359 (2014); John Hill, 
Note, North To The Future Of The Right To Bear Arms: Analyzing The Alaska 
Firearm Localism To Alaska, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 125 (2016). See also BLOCHER & 
MILLER, The Positive Second Amendment, supra note 27, at 189–90. 
 143. See Molly Cohen, A Practical Playbook to Beat State Preemption, CITYLAB 
(July 19, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/07/a-lawyers-playbook-to-
fight-state-preemption/533862/. 
 144. See Blocher, supra note 27, at 94–104 (discussing the rural-urban divide 
regarding preemption and differing gun cultures). 
 145. See id.; See also Scharff, Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1491–92. 
 146. See Matt Valentine, Disarmed: How Cities Are Losing the Power to 
Regulate Guns, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2014/03/disarmed-how-cities-are-losing-the-power-to-regulate-
guns/284220/ (“Such laws reflect a divide not only between those who favor 
expanded gun rights and those who oppose them, but also a geographical divide 
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of these respective constituencies in the state legislature can 
lead to preemption laws about firearms. The main advocacy 
groups on each side of firearm regulation see preemption as 
a focal issue in their efforts—the NRA-ILA,147 National 
Shooting Sports Foundation,148 the Second Amendment 
Foundation,149 Gun Owners of America,150 and the Firearms 
Policy Foundation151 on one side, and Everytown,152 the 
Giffords Law Center,153 and the Brady Law Center154 on the 
other. 
 
between policymakers. Metropolitan communities (where most gun crimes occur) 
tend to have a different perspective about gun rights and gun violence than their 
more rural surrounds.”). 
 147. See GOSS, supra note 2, at 162–65; Firearm Preemption Laws, NRA-ILA, 
https://www.nraila.org/get-the-facts/preemption-laws/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 148. See, e.g., Press Release, Bill Brassard, NSSF, NSSF Tells Seattle Mayor 
to Veto Gun and Ammunition Tax or Face Lawsuit (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://www.nssf.org/nssf-tells-seattle-mayor-to-veto-gun-and-ammunition-tax-
or-face-lawsuit/; Alert, NSSF, Anti-Gun Bill Hearing Scheduled in Nevada: NSSF 
Needs Your Help in Opposing AB 291 (Mar. 28, 2019), http://www2.nssf.org/ 
l/127421/2019-03-28/3qzl5f. 
 149. Press Release, Second Amendment Foundation, SAF, Florida Carry Sue 
Tallahassee For Preemption Law Violation, https://www.saf.org/saf-florida-carry-
sue-tallahassee-for-preemption-law-violation/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019); Press 
Release, Second Amendment Foundation, SAF, NRA Sue City Of Edmonds Over 
Wash. State Preemption Violation, https://www.saf.org/saf-nra-sue-city-of-
edmonds-over-wash-state-preemption-violation/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 150. See, e.g., State Alert, Val Finnell, Hold Cities and Municipalities 
Financially Responsible for Breaking the Law (May 1, 2019), https://gunowners 
.org/paalert5119/. 
 151. See, e.g., Press Release, Firearms Policy Coalition, Liberty Park Press: 
Seattle Mayor Signs Gun Control Ordinance Despite State Preemption, (Jul. 26, 
2018), https://www.firearmspolicy.org/liberty_park_press_seattle_mayor_signs_ 
gun_control_ordinance_despite_state_preemption. 
 152. See State Firearm Preemption Laws, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Feb. 
18, 2018), https://everytownresearch.org/fact-sheet-preemption-laws/. 
 153. See Preemption of Local Laws, GIFFORDS LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-
policies/preemption-of-local-laws (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 154. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief On Appeal for Brady Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence as Amicus Curiae, Michigan Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Public 
Schools, 918 N.W.2d 756 (Mich. 2018) (No, 155196). 
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Rationales for state preemption are usually formalist or 
functionalist.155 Formalists point to the doctrinal point that 
municipalities are technically organs or subdivisions of the 
state, with no inherent powers or legal independence under 
many state constitutions.156 Functionalists, on the other 
hand, typically emphasize the need for uniformity so that 
citizens do not inadvertently violate local laws while 
traveling about the state, to prevent unfairness in the form 
of disparate punishments in different cities, or to prevent one 
side (urban or rural) from imposing externalities on the 
other.157 Arguments for localism run along similar formal 
and functional lines: self-rule as an ideal (the “laboratories 
of democracy” in microcosm158)159 or self-rule for pragmatic 
 
 155. See Valentine, supra note 146. 
 156. See, e.g., Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1475–76 (“Under the 
modern view, local governments are creatures of state law, and the U.S. 
Constitution provides few, if any, substantive protections for local policymaking. 
For the most part, local government authority is limited to those powers 
enumerated in the states’ constitution and laws, and this authority is quite 
limited.”). 
 157. See id. at 1493 (“In the absence of state-level control, state policymakers 
may be concerned about the externalities that local policies impose on those 
outside the local jurisdiction.”).  
The NRA frames its support of preemption as an effort to simplify “a 
complex patchwork of restrictions that change from one local jurisdiction 
to the next.” There are just too many different ordinances, they say, 
which could be confusing or inconvenient to gun owners. 
“I can travel 30 minutes from my home and travel through four 
jurisdictions,” explained Kansas State Rifle Association President 
Patricia Stoneking, who testified in support of a new preemption bill that 
would eliminate what little local authority remained after Kansas 
passed a preemption law in 2007. “How am I to know what the law of all 
those jurisdictions say? What their individual ordinances are? 
Uniformity in all firearms laws is the most prudent action to take.” 
Valentine, supra note 146. 
 158. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1492 (“[A]llowing space for local 
government policymaking is another way our federalist system encourages 
innovation.”). 
 159. See id. (“[L]ocal control may improve substantive policymaking by 
allowing local ordinances to reflect local needs.”). 
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reasons, such as efficiency (tailoring),160 skin-in-the-game 
effects,161 information costs and asymmetries,162 and 
political accountability.163 
Some of the state preemption laws, at least related to 
firearms (but some are more general) carry a threat164—local 
officials can face fines or even imprisonment for ignoring the 
state preemption laws and proceeding with local rules and 
 
 160. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1491 (“First, allowing localities 
to pursue their own policy goals allows local residents to maximize their policy 
preferences.”). 
We have over 900 municipalities in Ohio, and often conditions and 
circumstances differ from one to another, so there’s a rationale for local 
governments to craft their own legislation. So that’s an argument for 
providing some flexibility to the local governments with regards to gun 
laws. 
 161. See also Valentine, supra note 146 (quoting Former Ohio Governor Bob 
Taft): 
California and Chula Vista assert an interest that only those with “skin 
in the game,” i.e. electors, who will be affected by the measure, should 
initiate the referendum process. The California state and local 
governments want only civic-minded locals, who presumably would have 
knowledge of local affairs and would themselves be affected by the 
referendum, to participate in the initiative process. 
See, e.g., Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F.3d 
671, 695 (9th Cir. 2014); Westover v. Idaho Ctys. Risk Mgmt. Program, 430 P.3d 
1284, 1289 (Idaho 2018) (plaintiff arguing it was “the legislature’s intent to bring 
some modicum of reasonableness to local government by requiring the 
government actors to have skin in the game.”). 
 162. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 140, at 1493 (“Further, local 
policymaking may be better in situations where locals and local officials have 
ground-level expertise in both the scope of the problem and in developing 
solutions.”). 
 163. See id. at 1492 (“For example, unlike state legislatures, which are almost 
all bicameral, local government experimentation can be put in place with the vote 
of the city council.”). 
 164. See id. at 1495–1504 (describing punitive preemption statutes); State 
Firearm Preemption Laws, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Feb. 18, 2018), available 
at https://everytownresearch.org/fact-sheet-preemption-laws/ (“The most 
sweeping firearm preemption laws contain onerous, punitive provisions designed 
to intimidate city officials from even attempting to address gun violence.”). 
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enforcement.165 The legality and prudence of such provisions 
are ripe questions for academic critique.166 
III. THE STATE OF COORDINATED RESEARCH INITIATIVES 
A. Private Foundations and State Governments Begin to 
Step In 
Even though the Dickie Amendment has stifled rigorous 
academic research about gun violence for the last two 
decades, we are beginning to see signs of researchers 
working around the problem. Private funding from 
philanthropic foundations is filling part of the gap, and at 
least one state (Cal.) has decided to use state funding for gun 
violence research.167 This section briefly describes the 
emerging research centers to make law professors aware of 
these resources (ongoing and recently-published empirical 
studies)—but also in hopes that readers in the legal academy 
 
 165. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3108(I) (West 2017) (imposing personal 
liability on local officials for fines up to $50,000 for intentional violations of 
preemption law); FLA. STAT. § 790.331(3) (West 2001) ( subjecting local officials 
to personal liability and removal from office for violating the state’s preemption 
law); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870(6) (West 2012) (amending Kentucky firearms 
preemption statute that now criminalizes violations of the preemption law); MISS. 
CODE. ANN. § 45-9-53(5)(c) (West 2015) (imposing fines on local officials who 
attempt to violate preemption statute, plus attorney’s fees); see also Sarah 
Holder, The Escalating City-State Battle Over Guns, CITYLAB (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/who-has-the-right-to-govern-your-guns/ 
558119/ (describing similar punitive measure bill pending in the South Caroline 
legislature, and putting it in the context of the nationwide trend). 
 166. See, e.g., Fla. Carry, Inc. v. Thrasher, 248 So. 3d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2018) (“[I]ssue of whether university was liable for encroachment on preemption 
of firearms and ammunition regulation was not moot.”); Fla. Carry, Inc. v. City 
of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that “provision 
of preemption statute addressing standing to sue for violations of the statute did 
not itself prohibit any activity;” and that “city ordinances were not promulgated 
within meaning of the preemption statute when they were republished.”); see also 
Jennifer Mascia, In Much of the Country, Cities Can’t Enact Their Own Gun 
Laws, THE TRACE (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/12/preemption-
nra-local-gun-laws/ (describing the current preemption laws, enforcement 
mechanisms, and potential legal challenges). 
 167. See HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at xxiv. 
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will see how they themselves could fit in with some of these 
endeavors. 
It appears that the only law school with a research center 
devoted to firearm law and policy is the new (launched in 
August 2018) Center for Firearms Law at Duke Law 
School,168 directed by Joseph Blocher, Darrell Miller, and 
Jacob Charles. The Center focuses on “the development and 
dissemination of reliable and balanced scholarship on issues 
surrounding firearms, gun rights and regulation, and the 
Second Amendment.”169 To this end, the Center has an online 
Repository of Historical Gun Laws, which is very useful for 
researchers, and helpful links to important recent 
scholarship in the area.170 This is a relatively new 
development—the center opened only recently. 
With major funding from the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation, RAND Corporation is leading the National 
Collaborative on Gun Violence Research (NCGVR),171 and it 
has conducted its first RFP for research grants in early 
2019.172 The RAND website has comprehensive, non-
partisan (even-handed) meta surveys of all existing 
empirical research on various issues related to gun 
violence.173 It is an ideal starting place for prospective 
researchers in the legal academy. The RAND-NCGVR 
project is in its second year. 
 
 168. See Duke Center for Firearms Law, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
https://law.duke.edu/firearms/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 169. See Second Amendment scholars Blocher and Miller co-direct new Duke 
Center for Firearms Law, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://law.duke.edu/news/second-amendment-scholars-blocher-and-miller-co-
direct-new-duke-center-firearms-law/. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See Funders, NATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON GUN VIOLENCE RESEARCH.  
 172. See Request for Proposals, NATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON GUN VIOLENCE 
RESEARCH, https://www.ncgvr.org/rfp.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 173. See Gun Policy in America, RAND CORP., https://www.rand.org/research/ 
gun-policy.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
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The Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
has a Center for Gun Policy and Research.174 The Center 
launched in 1995, and it has a public health emphasis. The 
Center publishes one major empirical study per year on 
average. The most recent is Estimating the Effects of Law 
Enforcement and Public Health Interventions Intended to 
Reduce Gun Violence in Baltimore (2018). 
As mentioned above, California in 2016 became the first 
state to provide state funding for gun violence research, the 
University of California Firearm Violence Research Center. 
The UC Davis Violence Prevention Research Program is 
hosting the Center,175 which emphasizes applied, actionable 
research and focuses on aspects of firearm violence that 
create the largest burden for the population at large, as well 
as those with particularly disproportionate effects on 
population subsets.176 Initial projects are an epidemiological 
study of gun violence in California, a new empirical study of 
the effectiveness of rigorous background check programs 
that include violent misdemeanor convictions, a new survey 
of gun ownership in California, and risk factors for recurrent 
gunshot injuries.177 The study published in 2018 is Firearm 
mortality in California, 2000-2015: the epidemiologic 
importance of within-state variation.178 
The Harvard School of Public Health (T.H. Chan) has a 
subdivision called the Harvard Injury Control Research 
 
 174. See Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research, JOHNS HOPKINS 
BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF LAW, https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-
institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 175. See Violence Research Program, UC DAVIS HEALTH, https://health.ucdavis 
.edu/vprp/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 176. Id. 
 177. UCFC Research Projects, UC DAVIS HEALTH, https://health.ucdavis.edu/ 
vprp/UCFC/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 178. Veronica A. Pear et al., Firearm mortality in California, 2000-2015: The 
epidemiologic importance of within-state variation, 28 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 
309 (2018). 
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Center, which studies, among other things, firearm injuries 
from an epidemiological perspective.179 The research 
publications are excellent, but the most recent is from 2013, 
unfortunately, and most of the research is more than ten 
years old. 
Of course, there are also advocacy groups that publish 
helpful reports. On the pro-gun side, the NRA-ILA reports on 
recent lawsuits, legislative initiatives, Congressional 
hearings, and so on, directed for gun owners and enthusiasts 
(NRA members and supporters).180 The National Shooting 
Sports Foundation (NSSF), which is the firearm industry’s 
trade association, has an online portal of “Fact Sheets and 
Backgrounders,”181 an impressively comprehensive 
collection of reports and position papers on legislative 
initiatives, lawsuits, and other policy developments. It 
represents the industry perspective, so there is no attempt to 
hide its bias, but the tone and emphasis is more industry-
centered than the NRA’s gun-owner-centered approach. 
Legal researchers would find many of these reports and 
position papers informative, at least, and professional-
sounding. Interestingly, the NSSF (speaking for the 
industry) strongly supports legal prohibitions of straw 
purchases, and has its own public-information campaign to 
discourage straw purchases on behalf of those ineligible to 
own firearms. 182 
 
 179. Harvard Injury Control Research Center, Mission, HARVARD T.H CHAN 
SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hicrc/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2019). 
 180. About the NRA Institute for Legislative Action, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N – INST. 
FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, https://www.nraila.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 181. Fact Sheets and Backgrounders, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND., 
https://www.nssf.org/government-relations/factsheets/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2019). 
 182. Larry Keane, Stopping Straw Purchases: Firearms, Industry, Law 
Enforcement Work to Make Our Communities Safer, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS 
FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nssf.org/stopping-straw-purchases-firearms-
industry-law-enforcement-work-make-communities-safer/. 
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On the other side, the Giffords Law Center (based at 
Rutgers),183 the Brady Center to End Gun Violence,184 and 
Everytown for Gun Safety185 have reports, position papers, 
and fact sheets advocating for a variety of firearm 
regulations, which update readers about legislative 
initiatives and important lawsuits. The breadth of coverage 
is again impressive (matching the NSSF and NRA-ILA, but 
each site hits some unique issues). For example, the Giffords 
Center has a clear, comprehensive discussion of the state 
preemption problem, state-by-state. The Trace is an online 
magazine about firearm policy—on the gun-control side—
and publishes Atlantic Monthly-quality articles and studies 
(serious in-depth journalism, albeit advocacy-tilted) about 
gun policy initiatives, problems or breakdowns in the current 
legal framework, and so on.186 
Even so, we need more in-depth rigorous legal 
scholarship on areas besides straightforward Second 
Amendment questions. For example, there is a dearth of 
scholarly commentary on administrative law issues related 
to firearm regulation—Chevron deference to the ATF, the 
legality and legal effect of executive orders, the problem of 
unfunded mandates for state reporting to the NICS 
background check program, “red flag” or “extreme risk” laws 
(confiscation of firearms from those adjudicated in an ex 
parte proceeding to present a danger to themselves or 
others), the problems that HIPAA privacy mandates present 
for reporting patients to the NICS, judicial review of various 
agency actions related to firearms and ammunition, and so 
on. In the field of torts, there are the obvious topics (which 
 
 183. GIFFORDS LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter 
.giffords.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 184. BRADY CENTER TO END GUN VIOLENCE, https://www.bradyunited.org (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 185. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, https://everytown.org (last visited Oct. 19, 
2019). 
 186. THE TRACE, https://www.thetrace.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
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received academic attention when they were new, but not 
recently) of the federal statutes immunizing gun 
manufacturers and gun owners from tort liability, with a 
landmark decision about the PLCAA from the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in March 2019.187 There are environmental 
policy issues, meriting attention from legal scholars, 
regarding the severe lead contamination of the ground and 
air at shooting ranges, and the resulting lead poisoning of 
wildlife and of people who work at or who frequent the 
shooting ranges. In the criminal law field, there is now a split 
among the federal circuit courts about the Second 
Amendment implications of felon-in-possession 
prohibitions,188 but not enough legal scholarship pushing for 
 
 187. See Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019). 
 188. See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (finding the statute violated the Second 
Amendment as applied). In contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have also rejected as-applied challenges, where the 
defendant claimed his prior conviction was for a non-violent felony. See Medina 
v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019)(upholding felon-in-possession ban as 
applied to nonviolent felon); Hatfield v. Barr, 925 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2019) (federal 
statute that criminalized being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm did 
not violate Second Amendment as applied to felon); Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 
438 (7th Cir. 2019) (non-violent felon’s unsuccessful challenge to felon 
dispossession statutes under the Second Amendment); Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 
F.3d 614, 626c27 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 500 (2017); 
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010); In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 
2009). On the other hand, every federal circuit court that has had occasion to 
consider a facial challenge to the federal felon-in-possession statute’s 
constitutionality has upheld the law. See, e.g., United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 
281 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 318 (4th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Rozier, 598 
F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 
(7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Eric Ruben and Joseph 
Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L. J. 1433, 1481 (2018) (“This relatively low 
success rate was largely due to 273 challenges to felon-in-possession statutes. 
These challenges, which account for 24 percent of the entire dataset, were 
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a new consensus, or giving courts guidance about which 
sister circuit’s approach to adopt. In bankruptcy law, some of 
the major firearms manufacturers have filed for bankruptcy 
in recent years, and others are on the brink—these are 
complex bankruptcy issues that deserve more academic 
study from those with expertise in the field. 
B. Anticipating Objections: John Lott 
Recently, John Lott, a full-time advocate for firearm 
prevalence, posted an unpublished article on the Social 
Science Research Network website entitled Myth: Firearms 
Research Fell After the NRA Restrictions on Federal 
Funding.189 In this manuscript, which dates from 2014, Lott 
claims to have counted the number of articles (and article 
pages) published every year pertaining to firearm research 
after the 1996 restrictions went into effect.190 He claims that 
the number of articles remained the same, or increased, 
although he admits that federal funding dropped off191 (he 
also highlights the private sources of funding for such 
research that were just emerging at the time, which he 
claims make the research biased).192 But his methodology is 
ridiculous—he merely did a PubMED search for all articles 
containing the word “firearm” or “gun” anywhere in the 
article, including the footnotes or bibliography.193 
It is easy to find numerous articles that mention guns or 
firearms are not projects about this subject, but merely 
mention it in passing as one of the chronic problems that 
 
rejected 99 percent of time and enjoyed no success at the federal appellate level 
during our study period.”). 
 189. John R. Lott & John Whitley, Myth: Firearms Research Fell after the NRA 
Restrictions on Federal Funding, CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 26, 
2014), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3295796. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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plague poor urban communities, and so forth. In other words, 
John Lott grossly overcounts the articles published in this 
period. It also appears Mr. Lott is counting his own prolific, 
repetitive publications in this count. His website claims that 
he has published over 100 articles in peer-review journals, 
many or most of which were during the same period; given 
that he is claiming there are sixty or more articles per year 
about guns, if ten of those are his, then that would mask a 
large drop-off in publications by university-affiliated 
researchers. This is not a matter of sophisticated statistical 
models—it is as simple as doing a search for the word 
“firearm” on Google Scholar and seeing the small percentage 
of results that are in fact articles about firearm prevalence 
or use. He also admits he included many articles about BB 
guns and air guns, which are not even covered under most 
state or federal gun laws.194 Near the end of his article, he 
resorts to assertions like this one: “There is also the problem 
that Public Health research is very poorly done, using 
primitive statistics, and is filled with statistical and logical 
errors.”195 A footnote offers support for this sweeping claim—
entirely from John Lott’s own writings. 
In 2019, Mr. Lott began asserting in op-eds and 
interviews that “The federal government has generously 
funded firearms research, spending over $43 million between 
2015 and 2018.”196 Mr. Lott does not provide any citations or 
sources for this figure. According to government websites 
like TAGGS (for NIH) and the National Institute of 
Justice/Office of Justice Programs, the sums are much 
smaller. The OJP lists just under $9 million in grants for 
firearm or gun violence research during the period in 
 
 194. See id.  
 195. Id.  
 196. John Lott, Gun Controls Backed by Dem Presidential Candidates Would 
Hurt Poor and Minorities, FOX NEWS (May 15, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/ 
opinion/john-lott-gun-controls-backed-by-dem-presidential-candidates-would-
hurt-poor-and-minorities. 
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question.197 The NIH total is just under $7 million198, but 
most of this appears to be carryovers (annual installments) 
from previously awarded grants that run for three or four 
years, rather than being new awards. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in 2012, as President 
Obama finished his first term, Congress expanded the 
Dickey Amendment to apply to the National Institute of 
Health (NIH) as well as the CDC. The two agencies are 
different in size and political vulnerability—the NIH has a 
much larger budget and is not subject to line-item funding 
approval from Congress.199 Also, “The CDC doesn’t 
completely ignore the issue of gun violence. In 2002, it 
created the National Violent Death Reporting System 
(NVDRS), which covers all types of violent deaths, including 
homicides and suicides committed with firearms. However, 
the NVDRS collects data from only 32 states.”200 After the 
Sandy Hook massacre, the NIH “in 2013 announced a 
funding opportunity for research examining violence, in 
particular firearm violence.”201 The first two awards that 
specifically addressed firearms were for Garen Wintemute’s 
research efforts at U.C. Davis,202 and the one awarded to 
 
 197. Past Funding Opportunities: Closed Solicitations – Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (last visited Oct. 19, 2019), 
https://ojp.gov/funding/Explore/PastFundingOpportunities.htm. 
 198. Cunningham et al., NIH Funds a Research Consortium to Address 
Firearm Deaths Among U.S. Children and Teens, UNIV. OF MICH. INST. FOR 
HEALTHCARE POL’Y & INNOVATION (Apr. 18, 2018), https://ihpi.umich.edu/news/ 
nih-funds-research-consortium-address-firearm-deaths-among-us-children-
teens; see Grants & Funding, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., NAT’L INST. 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last visited Oct. 19, 2019), https://grants.nih.gov/ 
funding/index.htm. 
 199. Rita Rubin, Tale of 2 Agencies: CDC Avoids Gun Violence Research But 
NIH Funds It, 315 JAMA 1689, 1689–91 (2016) https://jamanetwork.com/ 
journals/jama/fullarticle/2513131?appid=scweb&alert=article. 
 200. Id. at 1690. 
 201. Id. at 1691. 
 202. Garen Wintemute, Alcohol, Drugs and Other Prior Crimes and Risk of 
Arrest in Handgun Purchasers, NIH RESEARCH PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING 
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Rina Eiden, a substance abuse researcher at the University 
at Buffalo; Eiden received $723 000 in fiscal year 2015 to 
study the precursors of gun violence.203 The NIH provided 
$11.4 million to 14 research projects related to guns and gun 
violence between 2014 and 2017 as part of its Obama-era 
program for “Research on the Health Determinants and 
Consequences of Violence and its Prevention, Particularly 
Firearm Violence.”204 Things changed after the 2016 election. 
Recently, “NIH officials have noted that firearms researchers 
can continue to apply for NIH funding to study gun violence 
through a general application channel used by thousands of 
NIH applicants,205 but these are a fraction of the pre-2017 
levels. The NIH backed off from the research after President 
Trump took office in 2017.206 The N.R.A. pressured Congress 
and the agency to defund the research, charging that it was 
biased against guns.207 Members of Congress have demanded 
explanations from the NIH over discontinuing its program 
after Trump’s election.208 Some of the $7 million in NIH 
grants mentioned above are partial carryovers from the 
Obama-era awards. Also, note that the National Institute of 
 
TOOLS (Apr. 30, 2017), https://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_description 
.cfm?aid=8919078&icde=27426956&ddparam=&ddvalue=&ddsub=&cr=9&csb=
default&cs=ASC. 
 203. Rubin, supra note 194, at 1691. 
 204. Meredith Wadman, NIH Directors Stand Firm on Not Renewing Focused 
Firearm Research Program, SCI. MAGAZINE (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.science 
mag.org/news/2017/11/nih-institute-directors-stand-firm-not-renewing-focused-
firearm-research-program. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Meredith Wadman, NIH quietly shelves gun research program, SCI. 
MAGAZINE (Sep. 13, 2017 12:13 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017 
/09/nih-guietly-shelves-gun-research-program. 
 207. See id. 
 208. Letter from Frank Mallone, Jr., Ranking Member, and Bobby L. Rush, 
Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to Frank Collins, Director, 
Nat’l Inst. of Health (Nov. 14, 2017), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/ 
democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/HHS.NIH_.2017.10.30%
20Letter%20re%20firearm%20violence%20research.%20HE.pdf. 
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Justice (part of the OJP) makes almost $3 million in grants 
during this period to the firearm industry’s trade association, 
the National Sports Shooting Foundation, to help with 
things like “recruitment of more hunters,” i.e., firearm 
purchasers.209 The firearms industry is subsidized by federal 
tax funds. Perhaps Mr. Lott is including that in his $43 
million. 
The only way to derive a figure like Lott’s $43 million is 
to include grants from the OJP to state and local law 
enforcement agencies to help with reporting information to 
the NICS program, for officer training in shooting and gun 
safety, or for forensics labs to aid with ballistics research. He 
might also include the data-collection efforts (non-research) 
by the CDC and the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
In the Preface to the 2017 edition of his book Private 
Guns, Public Health, Harvard researcher David Hemenway 
describes his experience with the ongoing situation at the 
CDC: 
Republican congressmen, at the behest of the gun lobby, have so 
intimidated the CDC that the director says almost nothing about 
gun violence, and the staff is afraid to say the words “guns” or 
“firearms” at national meetings. On phone calls, if I mention guns 
with CDC professionals, it is not uncommon for them to ask to call 
me back. They then go outside so they can talk privately from their 
personal cell phones.210 
Hemenway also describes the current funding situation 
with the National Institute of Health—for the four decades 
from 1973 to 2012, the NIH awarded 486 research grants for 
the following four diseases: cholera, diphtheria, polio, and 
rabies—which have a combined total of two thousand 
reported cases each year. Yet there were four million injuries 
 
 209. Project ChildSafe: A Firearms Safety Program of the Nat’l Shooting Sports 
Found. 2017 Annual Review, PROJECT CHILDSAFE, INC. (last visited Oct. 19, 2019), 
https://www.projectchildsafe.org/sites/default/files/Project%20ChildSafe%20201
7%20Annual%20Review.pdf. 
 210. HEMENWAY, supra note 2, at xv. 
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from firearms during the same period, and the NIH funded 
just three research grants.211 
CONCLUSION 
In March 2019, Andrew Morrall, the RAND-based 
director of the National Collaborative on Gun Violence 
Research, testified before a House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, 
Education, and Related Agencies to make the case for federal 
funding of gun violence research.212 It was the first House 
Appropriations hearing dedicated to the funding issues since 
1996.213 The testimony focused on the current lack of 
scientific evidence to support policies about gun violence (on 
either side), and the potential for high quality research to 
inform policy development in this area. The federal 
government provides fifty times as much funding for 
research about other causes of deaths that kill similar 
numbers of people.214 “Even basic questions like whether gun 
free zones deter or attract gun violence, or whether child-
access prevention laws prevent gun owners from defending 
themselves in emergencies have not been rigorously 
studied.”215 One month later, the House Appropriations 
Committee approved $50 million for the CDC to conduct 
scientific research to reduce injuries from gun violence.216 Of 
 
 211. See id. at xv–xvi. 
 212. Reducing Disagreements on Gun Policy Through Scientific Research and 
an Improved Data Infrastructure: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Labor, Health 
& Human Servs., Educ., & Related Agencies, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of 
Andrew Morrall, Director, National Collaborative on Gun Violence Research). 
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Labor-HHS-Education Funding Bill (Apr. 29, 2019), https://appropriations.house 
2019] SCHOLARSHIP ON FIREARM POLICY 1505 
 
course, it remains doubtful that the Republican-controlled 
Senate would approve the allocation.217 
In the meantime, law professors can commence work and 
help fill in the gap. As we produce useful scholarship, authors 
and law review editors should make special efforts to 
disseminate the research in this area without cost to 
researchers in other fields and to the public, as the Harvard 
Law Review currently does with its recent archives on its 
website, or through online portals like the Social Science 
Research Network and Bepress. In other words, not behind 
a paywall. 
Law professors at major universities may underestimate 
the problem and how it stymies both interdisciplinary 
research and data-driven policymaking.218 Universities 
typically provide their law faculty with free, unlimited access 
to ScienceDirect, JStor, and Hein databases, a convenience 
that we take for granted.219 Conversely, researchers in other 
 
.gov/news/press-releases/appropriations-committee-releases-fiscal-year-2020-
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fields (sociology, public health, and so on), advocacy groups, 
state-level policymakers, influential bloggers, and 
journalists often do not have free access to Westlaw or Lexis 
databases for law review articles. As outlined above, 
empirical researchers in other fields who wish to study gun 
prevalence, predictors of gun violence, and so on need ex ante 
theorization from the legal academy to frame their studies 
appropriately; and they need easy access to our work. 
Research-driven firearm policy is an inherently 
interdisciplinary endeavor. 
Public access to scholarship on firearm policy should be 
a factor in our decisions about where or how to publish final 
works, or at least could be an added provision to the 
publication agreements we have with law reviews. Similarly, 
law professors who have high-readership blogs should 
commit to directing readers’ attention to high-quality 
emerging scholarship about gun policy. 
There is an additional role for law faculty besides 
publication of traditional law review articles. We have 
opportunities to participate in amicus briefs when firearm-
related legislative initiatives face court challenges. Even 
more importantly, or at least more urgently, law professors 
have opportunities to participate in legislative drafting 
projects, either on their own, at their state legislature, or 
through collectives like the American Law Institute, the 
Uniform Law Commission, and various thinktanks—a 




a single article in a traditional law review even mentioning the issue. 
